Volume 16

Issue 3

Article 1

1971

Williams v. Florida: End of a Theory - Part I
O. John Roger

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Common Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons,
Criminal Law Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
O. J. Roger, Williams v. Florida: End of a Theory - Part I, 16 Vill. L. Rev. 411 (1971).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss3/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Roger: Williams v. Florida: End of a Theory - Part I

Villanova Law Review
VOLUME

16

MARCH

1971

NUMBER

3

WILLIAMS v. FLORIDA: END OF A THEORY
PART I*
0. JOHN ROGGEt
I.

THE THEORY'S FURTHEST REACH

REAR THE END of the term in June 1970 the Supreme Court
of the United States decided two cases, one of which, Williams
v. Florida,' marks the beginning of the end of the theory on which
the other case, Baldwin v. New York,2 was decided. Both cases were
decided on the same day.3
In Baldwin v. New York the Court, on the basis that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment made the sixth amendment
provision for trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions applicable to
the states, invalidated the section of the New York City Criminal
Court Act which allows a denial of a jury trial on a charge that could
result in more than six months imprisonment.
But in Williams v. Floridathe Court sustained Florida's statutory
provision for a jury of six persons in non-capital criminal cases. One
is thus warranted in hoping that Williams will be the straw that
breaks the back of the incorporation theory and its makeshift double,
"selective incorporation."
Ironically enough, it was trial by jury, although under the seventh
amendment provision for such a trial in suits at common law where the
value in controversy exceeded twenty dollars, that Justice Frankfurter
cited as an example in challenging the historical correctness of the
incorporation theory in his concurring opinion in Adamson v. Cali*

This is the first of a two-part article. The second part will appear in the next

issue of the Villanova Law Review.
t Member of the New York Bar. A.B., University of Illinois, 1922; LL.B.,
1925, S.J.D., 1931, Harvard University.

1.399 U.S. 78 (1970).
2. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
3.June 22, 1970.

(411)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1971

1

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

16 : p. 411

fornia4 The incorporation theory was propounded by Justice Black
in his dissent in that case. Justice Frankfurter answered:
Even the boldest innovator would shrink from suggesting to
more than half the States that they may no longer initiate prosecutions without indictment by grand jury, or that. thereafter all
the States of the Union must furnish a jury of twelve for every
case involving a claim above twenty dollars. . .. '
II.

THE INCORPORATION THEORY

In Adamson v. California,6 the United States Supreme Court
sustained the validity of California constitutional and statutory provisions permitting comment on a defendant's failure to take the stand
in a criminal case and rejected the contention that the fourteenth
amendment made the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the states. Justice Black, in a dissent in which
Justice Douglas joined, and with the agreement on this point of
Justices Murphy and Rutledge, expressed the view that historically
"one of the chief objects that the provisions of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment's first section, separately, and as a whole, were intended
to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states."'
Two years later these four justices adhered to this view in Wolf v.
Colorado," where the Court affirmed a state court conviction based on
evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search, although
Justice Black concurred with the majority on the ground that "the
federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the fourth amendment
but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might
negate." 9
The view which Justice Black propounded in his dissent in
Adamson became known as the incorporation theory. The Court never
accepted it, as Justice Black admitted in the second of his three James
S. Carpentier lectures at the Columbia Law School in 1968:10
Although I assure you that I am still trying, I have never
been able at any one time to get a majority of the Court to agree
to my belief that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates all of
4. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
5. Id. at 64-65.

6. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
7. Id. at 71-72.
8. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).

9. Id. at 39-40. A federal conviction based up~on evidence obtained in like manner
by federal officials would have been reversed. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914).
10. Printed with revisions in H. BLAcic, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968).
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the Bill of Rights' provisions (the first eight Amendments to the
Constitution) and makes them applicable to the states. ....
.

Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, 2 listed ten justices (the first Justice Harlan, Justices Field,
Black, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge, Bradley, Swayne, probably Justice
Brewer, and seemingly Justice Clifford) who accepted the view that the
fourteenth amendment's first section made the safeguards of the Federal
Bill of Rights applicable to the states, but then added: "Unfortunately
it has never commanded a Court."'"
On the Court, the severest critics of Justice Black's incorporation
theory have been Justices Frankfurter and Harlan; and historically they
are correct. The framers of the fourteenth amendment did not intend
its first section to make the first eight amendments applicable to the
states. The evidence amply supports Professor Charles Fairman's
conclusion with reference to Justice Black's position: "In his contention that Section I was intended and understood to impose amendments I to VIII upon the states, the record of history is overwhelming'
ly against him."14
Indeed, the framers of the fourteenth amendment did not give
much more hard thought to the meaning of its first section, than did
the barons at Runnymede give to the phrase "law of the land" in the
Magna Charta which they drew from King John. If one had asked one
of the barons what law of the land meant, he would have done well if
he could have repeated what Henry II told the five judges he appointed
for the whole kingdom in 1178: He told them "to do right judgment."' 5
Comparably, the framers of the fourteenth amendment could not have
given specific content to its due process clause. That job was for the
bench and bar.
11.

Id. at 36.

12. 372 U.S. 335, 346 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
13. Id. at 346, cited in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (1964). In his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), he listed the same ten justices,
and commented, referring to the safeguards of the federal Bill of Rights:
Yet the constitutional conception of "due process" must, in my view, include them
all until and unless there are amendments that remove them. That has indeed
been the view of a full Court of nine Justices, though the members of that court
unfortunately did not sit at the same time.
Id. at 516.
14. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?,

The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 139 (1949), voluminously setting

forth the evidence on this point; see also 0.

38-53

ROGGE, THE FIRST AND THE FIFrH

(1960); Rogge, State Power Over Sedition, Obscenity and Picketing, 34

N.Y.U.L. REV. 817, 818-35 (1959).
15. 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 482 (D. Douglas & G. Greenaway eds.

1953). Inthe years 1176-1178, Henry II instituted a permanent court of professional
judges. At first he divided the kingdom into six regions and appointed three judges
for each region, but this proved too cumbersome. He then appointed five judges for
the whole kingdom.
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Justice Black in adherence to his incorporation theory feels, as he
has stated at various times, that his theory gives greater certainty
with reference to human rights than does the case-by-case approach to
due process, which he characterizes as having accordian-like qualities.
As he explained in his concurring opinion in Rochin v. California,"
where the Court upset a state court conviction based on evidence obtained by pumping the defendant's stomach against his will:
In the view of a majority of the Court, however, the Fifth
Amendment imposes no restraint of any kind on the states. They
nevertheless hold that California's use of this evidence violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since
they hold as I do in this case, I regret my inability to accept
their interpretation without protest. But I believe that faithful
adherence to the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures
a more permanent protection of individual liberty than that which
can be afforded by the nebulous standards stated by the majority.
What the majority holds is that the Due Process Clause empowers -this Court to nullify any state law if its application "shocks
the conscience," offends "a sense of justice," or runs counter
to the "decencies of civilized conduct ...
I long ago concluded that the accordion-like qualities of this
philosophy must inevitably imperil all the individual liberty safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Reflection
and recent decisions of this Court sanctioning abridgment of the
freedom of speech and press have strengthened this conclusion.'
In his concurring opinion in Kingsley International Pictures Corp.
v. Regents,1 8 where the Court lifted a ban on Lady Chatterley'sLover,
he added:
We are told that the only way we can decide whether a State
or municipality can constitutionally bar movies is for this Court
to view and appraise each movie on a case-by-case basis. Under
these circumstances, every member of the Court must exercise his own judgment as to how bad a picture is, a judgment
which is ultimately based at least in large part on his own standard
of what is immoral. The end result of such decisions seems to me
to be purely personal determination by individual Justices as to
whether a particular picture viewed is too bad to allow it to be
seen by the public. Such an individualized determination cannot
be guided by reasonably fixed and certain standards. Accordingly,
neither States nor moving picture makers can possibly know in
16. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).

17. Id. at 175, 177.
18. 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
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advance, with any fair degree of certainty, what can or cannot
be done in the field of movie making and exhibiting. This uncertainty cannot easily be reconciled with the rule of law which our
constitution envisages.' 9
Justice Black was the only member of the Court who did not see the
film in question.
In the second of his three James S. Carpentier lectures in 1968 he
used Rochin as an illustration and restated his position:
The majority opinion in the Rochin case exemplifies in a
concrete situation what I object to most in what I consider to be
an unwarranted interpretation of the Due Process Clause. For
the majority there held that the Due Process Clause empowers
the Supreme Court to nullify any state law if its application "shocks
the conscience," offends "a sense of justice," or runs counter
to the "decencies of civilized conduct." Judges are to measure the
validity of state practices, according to the Rochin opinion, not
only by their reason and by the traditions of the legal profession,
but by "the community's sense of fair play and decency"; by the
"traditions and conscience of our people"; or by "those canons
of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples. ' 20
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Williams v. Florida,"'
in which Justice Douglas joined, Justice Black wrote:
. . . In my opinion the danger of diluting the Bill of Rights
protections lies not in the "incorporation doctrine," but in the
"shock the conscience" test on which my Brother HARLAN
would rely instead - a test which depends not on the language
of the Constitution but solely on the views of a majority of the
'22
Court as to what is "fair" and "decent.
19. Id. at 690-91.
20. H. BLACK, supra note 10, at 29-30.
21. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).

22. Id. at 107. Justice Black reiterated this point of view in his dissenting opinion

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377-78 (1970), where the Court held that a finding of
juvenile delinquency had to be beyond a reasonable doubt:

I realize that it is far easier to substitute individual judges' ideas of "fairness"
for the fairness prescribed by the Constitution, but I shall not at any time surrender my belief that the document itself should be our guide, not our own
concept of what is fair, decent, and right. That this old "shock the conscience"

test is what the Court is relying on, rather than the words of the Constitution is
clearly enough revealed by the reference of the majority to "fair treatment" and
to the statement by the dissenting judges in the New York Court of Appeals

that failure to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt amounts to a "lack of
fundamental fairness." Ante, at 359, 363. As I have said time and time again,
I prefer to put my faith in the words of the written Constitution itself rather

than to rely on the shifting, day-to-day standards of fairness of individual judges.
In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959), another obscenity case,
he wrote :

What is the standard by which one can determine when abridgment of speech

and press goes "too far" and when it is slight enough to be constitutionally
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Justice Clark reasoned comparably to Justice Black in his concurrence in Irvine v. California,2" where the Court sustained a state
court conviction based on evidence obtained through an illegal breaking and entering and an illegally secreted microphone:
Of course, we could sterilize the rule announced in Wolf by,
adopting a case-by-case approach to due process, in which inchoate notions of propriety concerning local police conduct guide
our decisions. But this makes for such uncertainty and unpredictability that it would be impossible to tell - other than by
guesswork - just how brazen the invasion of the intimate privacies of one's home must be in order to shock itself into the
protective arms of the Constitution. In truth, the practical result
of this ad hoc approach is simply that when five Justices are
sufficiently revolted by local police action, a conviction is overturned and a guilty man may go free. Rochin bears witness to
this. We may thus vindicate the abstract principle of due process,
but we do not shape the conduct of local police one whit; unpredictable reversals on dissimilar fact situations are not likely to curb
the zeal of those police and prosecutors who may be intent on
racking up a high percentage of successful prosecutions. I do
not believe that the extension of such a vacillating course beyond
the clear cases of physical coercion and brutality, such as Rochin,
would serve a useful purpose. 4
Justice Stewart in an address in 1968, the same year that Justice
Black gave his James S. Carpentier lectures, pointed out that the
motivational origin of the incorporation theory was the desire for
greater certainty:
allowable? Is this momentous decision to be left to a majority of this Court on
a case-by-case basis? What express provision or provisions of the Constitutior.
put freedom of speech and press in this precarious position of subordination
and insecurity?
In his dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69, 70 (1947),
he said:
This decision reasserts a constitutional theory spelled out in Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, that this Court is endowed by the Constitution with
boundless power under "natural law" periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to conform to the Court's conception of what at a particular
time constitutes "civilized decency" and "fundamental liberty and justice ...
But I would not reaffirm the Twining decision. I think that decision and the
"natural law" theory of the Constitution upon which it relies degrade the constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and simultaneously appropriate for
this Court a broad power which we are not authorized by the Constitution
to exercise.
It was in his dissent in Adainson that Justice Black indicated that if he could
not have total incorporation he would settle for selective incorporation:
If the choice must be between the selective process of the Palko decision applying
some of the Bill of Rights to the States, or the Twining rule applying none of
them, I would choose the Palko selective process.
Id. at 89.
23. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
24. Id. at 138-39.
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Shortly before Justice Jackson came to the Court, some of its
then more junior members had embraced the comforting theory
that the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive impact upon the
States could be exactly measured by the specific restrictions that
the first eight Amendments imposed upon the National Government. I call this a "comforting" theory, because, for critics of
the old Court's subjective approach to due process, it was a
theory that appeared to give the Fourteenth Amendment objective
content and definable scope ...
.
But the additional certainty which Justice Black hoped to obtain
by his incorporation theory is largely illusory anyway. It is true that
after Gideon v. Wainwright" there will no longer have to be a caseby-case examination in noncapital state cases on the lack of counsel
issue. Yet even in the area covered by the first eight amendments, the
members of the Court have disagreed and will continue to disagree
as to the meaning and application of various of the provisions of these
amendments under a substantial number of variant circumstances.
A
2
striking illustration of this fact was Ker v. California,
" as Justice Harlan pointed out parenthetically 29 in concurring in the result; the eight
justices who announced that the fourth amendment was wholly applicable to the states, then divided equally as to whether it had been
violated. In any event, the overriding objection to Justice Black's
incorporation theory is that it is historically incorrect.
III.

"SELECTIVE INCORPORATION"

Despite the historical accuracy of the position of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, the Court, in its applications of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, travelled so far in the direction of
the result Justice Black sought to obtain in Adamson that it seemed
substantially to have arrived there, with but the single exception of
the fifth amendment provision for indictment by a grand jury. This
was the only exception that it seemed safe to say would not be made
applicable to the states. The only one of the old cases that would
0
probably withstand the advance was Hurtado v. California,"
where the
25. Stewart, Robert H. Jackson's Influence on Federal State Relationships, 23
RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 7 21 (1968), reprinted in MR. JUSTICE JAcKsON, FOUR
LECTURES IN His HONOR 76 (1969), quoted in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion

in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 144 n.2 (1970).
26. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
27. 0. ROGGE, THE FIRST AND THE FitrH 74-75 (1960); Rogge, Concept of
Ordered Liberty -

A New Case, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 238, 264-65 (1959).

28. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
29. Id. at 45.
30. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
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Court decided that a state could proceed by way of an information
rather than by indictment by a grand jury. Our jury system, grand as
well as petit, was shrinking; and even the fifth amendment would not
be able to change this trend.
As the Court continued to approach closer to Justice Black's
position in Adamson, Justice Harlan continued to complain. In his
concurring opinion in Pointer v. Texas,3' a recent confrontation case,
he grumbled:
This is another step in the onward march of the long-since discredited "incorporation" doctrine . . . , which for some reason

that I have not yet been able to fathom has come into the sun-

light in recent years .... 32

In his concurring opinion in the more recent case of Griffin v.
California," where the Court applied to the states as part of the
fifth amendment the federal rule against comment on a defendant's
failure to take the witness stand, he grumbled some more: ". . . the
decision exemplifies the creeping paralysis with which the Court's
recent adoption of the 'incorporation' doctrine is infecting the operation
of the federal system." 4
Then in his dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. New York,"3 and
in his concurring opinion in Williams v. Florida,8 he summarized the
Court's course in nearly arriving at Justice Black's destination in his
incorporation theory:
The recent history of constitutional adjudication in state
criminal cases is the ascendancy of the doctrine of ad hoc ("selective") incorporation, an approach that absorbs one-by-one individual guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and holds them
applicable to the States with all the subtleties and refinements
born of history and embodied in case experience developed in the
context of federal adjudication. Thus, with few exceptions the
Court has "incorporated," each time over my protest, almost all
the criminal protections found within the first eight Amendments
to the Constitution, and made them "jot-for-jot and case-for-case"
applicable to the States.
The process began with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
where the Court applied to the States the so-called exclusionary
31.
32.
33.
34.

380 U.S. 400 (1965).
Id. at 408.
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Id. at 616.

35. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
36. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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rule, rendering inadmissible at trial evidence seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, and thereby overruling pro tanto Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See my dissenting opinion, 367
U.S. at 672. The particular course embarked upon in Mapp was
blindly followed to its end in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963), where the Court made federal standards of probable cause
for search and seizure applicable to the States, thereby overruling
the remainder of Wolf. See my concurring opinion, 374 U.S. at
44. Thereafter followed Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and
Griffin v. California,380 U.S. 609 (1965), overruling Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), and Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947), and incorporating the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination by holding that "the same
standards must determine whether an accused's silence in either a
federal or state proceeding is justified." 378 U.S. at 11. See
my dissenting opinion in Malloy, 378 U.S., at 14 and my concurring opinion in Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615. The year of Griffin also
brought forth Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), overruling Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), and Stein
v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 194 (1953), by holding that the
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause applied equally to the
States and Federal Government. See my concurring opinion, 380
U.S. at 408. In 1967 incorporation swept in the "speedy trial"
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967), and in 1968 Duncan v. Louisiana, supra,
rendered the Sixth Amendment jury trial a right secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Proces Clause. Only last Term the
Court overruled Palko v. Connecticut, supra, and held that the
"double jeopardy" protection of the Fifth Amendment was incorporated into the Fourteenth, and hence also carried to the States.
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); see my concurring
opinion in Klopfer, 386 U.S., at 226; my dissenting opinion in
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 171; my dissenting opinion in Benton, 395
U.S. at 784, and my separate opinion in North Carolinav. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 744 (1969). In combination these cases have in
effect restructured the Constitution in the field of state criminal
law enforcement.8 7

Justice Black in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Williams
v. Florida,88 in which Justice Douglas joined, indicated his own satis37. Id. at 130-32. Some years ago, the writer in Rogge, A Technique for
Change, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 481, 514 (1964), wrote:
Indeed, the Court has traveled so far in the direction of the result advocated
by Mr. Justice Black that, with three exceptions it had substantially arrived
at it. The exceptions are all fifth amendment provisions: indictment by a grand
jury; double jeopardy; and the privilege against self-incrimination. The first is
the only one of the three of which it may be safely said that it will not be made
applicable to the states. ...

38. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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faction at the Court's approach to the end result he had in mind with
his incorporation theory:
As I have frequently stated, in my opinion the Fourteenth
Amendment was in part adopted in order to make the provisions of
the Bill of Rights fully applicable to the States. See, e.g., Adamson
v. California,332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion). This
Court has now held almost all these provisions do apply to the
States as well as the Federal Government, including the Fifth
Amendment provision involved in this case. See Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964); cases cited in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
382 n. 11 (1970) (BLACK, J., dissenting). .... 39
Although the Court nearly arrived at Justice Black's position in
Adamson, it did so not on his reasoning, nor on his total incorporation
theory, but rather on the absorption process phraseology of Justice
Cardozo in the Court's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut" where the
Court sustained a Connecticut statute which gave the state an appeal
in criminal cases. In Palko, Justice Cardozo stated that by virtue of
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, the provisions of the
Federal Bill of Rights which were "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" 41 applied also to the states. This clause brought these provisions
"within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption."4 As
Justice Frankfurter observed in the Court's opinion in Bartkus v.
Illinois, 4 where the Court sustained a state prosecution of the same
acts on which there had been a federal court acquittal, Justice Cardozo's
statement for the Court in Palko "has especially commended itself and
been frequently cited in later opinions. '44 Even Justices Black and
Brennan began to cast their opinions in terms of Justice Cardozo's
45
absorption process reasoning.
39. Id. at 108 n.2. In the second of his three James S. Carpentier lectures in
1968, Justice Black indicated similarly:
Through this process of selective incorporation the Supreme Court has held
that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against infringement by the states
the liberties of the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment's rights to
notice, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process for witnesses, and the
assistance of counsel, and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishments. The Fifth Amendment's provision for just compensation
had been applied to the states before the Palko decision by an essentially
similar process ...
Printed with revisions in H. BLACK, supra note 10, at 38.
40. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
41. Id. at 325.
42. Id. at 326.
43. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
44. Id. at 127.
45. See, e.g., Abington Township School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253-54
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)
(Black, J., in the Court's opimon) ; Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263,
275 (1960) (Brennan, J.).
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On the point of phraseology, only Justice Douglas held out. In his
statement joining in the Court's opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright,"
after listing the ten justices who supported the incorporation theory
and commenting that unfortunately this view had never commanded a
Court, he continued: "Yet, happily, all constitutional questions are always open."' 7 He also joined in the Court's opinion in Malloy v.
Hogan,' although in doing so he still adhered to his concurrence in
Gideon.
The specifics of the first eight amendments which the Court made
applicable to the states by the absorption process phraseology of Justice
Cardozo became known as selective incorporation. This process reached
9 which held the fifth
such a point that in Benton v. Maryland,"
amendment provision against double jeopardy applicable to the states, the
Court used what had come to be regarded as the approach in Palko
to overrule Palko itself. As Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in
Benton, in which Justice Stewart joined, commented:
I would hold, in accordance with Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319 (1937), that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not take over the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth, as such. Today Palko becomes another casualty in the so far
unchecked march toward "incorporating" much, if not all, of the
Federal Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause ...
More broadly, that this Court should have apparently become
so impervious to the pervasive wisdom of the constitutional philosophy embodied in Palko, and that it should have felt itself able
to attribute to the perceptive and timeless words of Mr. justice
Cardozo nothing more than a "watering down" of constitutional
rights, are indeed revealing symbols of the extent to which we
are weighing anchors from the fundamentals of our constitutional
system.5 0
Selective

incorporation

became

as dogmatic

in

application

as

Justice Black's incorporation theory was wrong in history; for Justices
Douglas and Brennan along with Justice Black insisted in their opinions
that any of the specifics of the Federal Bill of Rights which the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment absorbed and thus made
applicable to the states had to be applied in the same manner and to
the same extent in state courts as in federal courts. For instance,
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Id. at 346.
378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964).
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
Id. at 808, 809.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1971

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16: p. 411

in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price,51 where the Court, evenly divided
(Justice Stewart not taking part),52 sustained an inspection order of
a house, Justice Brennan in a statement in which Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black and Douglas joined, wrote:
Some of us have expressed the conviction that the preferable view
of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it makes the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights generally enforceable against the states ...
But to them, as well as to us, who have neither accepted nor rejected that view, it is clear that the celebrated passage of Justice
Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut . . . can have no common ground with the view of the Wolf case that a minority of the
Court now expounds. . . . For the Palko opinion refers to a
"process of absorption" . . . of specific Bill of Rights guarantees in the Fourteenth Amendment's standard. It is not a license
to the judiciary to administer a watered-down, subjective version
of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights when state cases
come before us. To be sure, the contrary view has been urged,
occasionally with success; the right to counsel was put on an
ad hoc basis, Betts v. Brady, . . . despite what seems the clear
implication to the contrary in Palko . . . and recently the surprising suggestion has even been made (never by the Court) that
the freedom of speech and of the press may be secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment with less vigor than it is secured by the
First. ....
5.
Or again in Malloy v. Hogan,5 4 where the Court held the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the states,
overruling both Adamson v. California,5 as well as Twining v. New
Jersey,56 Justice Brennan wrote for the Court:
The Court thus has rejected the notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to the states only a "watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights." 5
51. 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
52. He recused himself because the case came from the Ohio Supreme Court,
where his father then served. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 249

(1959) (Clark, J., mem.)
53. 364 U.S. at 274-75. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1963), wrote:
My brother HARLAN is of the view that a guarantee of the Bill of Rights
that is made applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment is

a lesser version of the same guarantee as applied to the Federal Government.
Mr. Justice Jackson shared that view. But that view has not prevailed and rights
protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment are not watered-down versions of what the Bill of Rights guarantees.
54. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
55. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
56. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
57. 378 U.S. at 10-11, quoted by Justice Black inhis opinion concurring and
dissenting inpart, in which Justice Douglas joined in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 107 (1970).
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Two illustrations will suffice. After Mapp v. Ohio,"6 where the
Court held that material illegally seized by state officers was inadmissible even in a state court proceeding, overruling its earlier and oft
cited case to the contrary, Wolf v. Colorado,5 9 the Court went on in
Ker v. California,6" and announced that its Mapp holding was enforceable against the states not only by the same sanction of exclusion as
against the federal government, but also by the same constitutional
standard prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Again, after
Malloy v. Hogan,6 ' the Court held in Griffin v. California,2 that its
ruling in Malloy was to be taken literally: Accordingly the federal
rule against comment on a defendant's failure to take the stand
governed in the states as well.
Three more cases, Washington v. Texas, 68 where the Court held

that -the sixth amendment right of an accused to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor was applicable to the states,
Duncan v. Louisiana,64 where the Court held similarly as to the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions, and
Benton v. Maryland,6 5 where the Court overruled even Palko, persuaded many of those who believed Justice Black's incorporation theory
to be historically incorrect, that the Court, with the exception of the
fifth amendment provision of indictment by grand jury, had arrived
at Justice Black's position after all, although in the guise of selective
incorporation. In Washington v. Texas, Chief Justice Warren in the
Court's opinion wrote that ",in recent years we have increasingly looked
to the specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment to determine whether
a state criminal trial was conducted with due process of law." 6 In
Benton v. Maryland, Justice Marshall in the Court's opinion put Chief
Justice Warren's statement more broadly to make it applicable generally
to the specific guarantees of the Federal Bill of Rights. 7 Those who felt
that Justice Black's incorporation theory was wrong historically began
to resign themselves to the philosophical reflection that even though
the Court's position was historically incorrect, and although state diversity was sacrificed to federal conformity, at least the country would
have a higher standard of criminal justice generally than it would have
58. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

59. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
60. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
61. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
62. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
63. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
64. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
65. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
66. 388 U.S. at 18.
67. 395 U.S. at 794.
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had otherwise. Only Justice Harlan seemed to be holding out for
historical accuracy.
IV.

JUSTICE HARLAN

When the Court first started on its selective incorporation course,
Justice Harlan time and again made clear, and even emphasized, that
the Court was not adopting the incorporation theory. In his opinion for
the Court in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,6" where the Court held that an
Alabama court order which required the N.A.A.C.P. to produce its
Alabama membership lists violated the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause, he was careful not to say that this clause made the
first amendment applicable to the states:
. . . It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech ...
"
In his concurring opinion in Alberts v. California70 and dissenting opinion in Roth v. United States,7 1 where the Court sustained state and

federal obscenity legislation, he stated:
. . . We can inquire only whether the state action so subverts the
fundamental liberties implicit in the Due Process Clause that it
cannot be sustained as a rational exercise of power. See Jackson,
J., dissenting in Beauharnaisv. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287. The
States' power to make printed words criminal is, of course, confined by the Fourteenth Amendment, but only insofar as such
power is inconsistent with our concepts of "ordered liberty."
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-325 ...
I agree with Mr. Justice Jackson that the historical evidence does
not bear out the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment "incor-

porates" the First in any literal sense ...

72

In his concurring opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright"' he took pains
to say:
In what is done today I do not understand the Court to depart
from the principles laid down in Palko v. Connecticut...
68. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
69. Id. at 460.

70.
71.
72.
73.

354 U.S. 476 (1957).
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Id. at 501, 503.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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[O]r to embrace the concept that the Fourteenth
Amendment
74
"incorporates" the Sixth Amendment as such.
After the Court was on its selective incorporation course, Justice
Harlan steadfastly opposed its incorporation reasoning, in concurring
opinions when he agreed with the Court's results, and in dissenting
ones when he did not. In his dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. New
York 75 and his concurring opinion in Williams v. Florida,7' he summarized his resistance and reasons therefor:
These decisions demonstrate that the difference between a
"due process" approach, that considers each particular case on
its own bottom to see whether the right alleged is one "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty," see Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937), and "selective incorporation" is not an
abstract one whereby different verbal formulae achieve the same
results. The internal logic of the selective incorporation doctrine
cannot be respected if the Court is both committed to interpreting
faithfully the meaning of the federal Bill of Rights and recognizing
the governmental diversity that exists in this country. The "backlash" in Williams exposes the malaise, for there the Court dilutes
a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of "incorporation," the "jot-for-jot" and "case-for-case" application of the
federal right to the States, with the reality of federalism. Can
one doubt that had Congress tried to undermine the common Law
right to trial by jury before Duncan came on the books the history
today recited would have barred such action? Can we expect
repeat performances when this Court is called upon to give definition and meaning to other federal guarantees that have been
"incorporated"?
In Ker v. California,374 U.S. 23 (1963), I noted in a concurring opinion that "The rule [of "incorporation"] is unwise
because the States, with their differing law enforcement problems,
should not be put in a constitutional straight jacket, . . . And

if the Court is prepared to relax [federal] standards in order
to avoid unduly fettering the States, this would be in derogation
of law enforcement standards in the federal system .

. .

."

Id.,

at 45-46. Only last Term in Chimel v. California, supra, I again
expressed my misgivings that "incorporation" would neutralize
74. Id. at 352. In Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 147 (1962), which sustained a contempt conviction for refusal to answer certain questions of a committee
of the New York legislature, Justice Harlan wrote in a concurring opinion:
I do not understand anything in the Court's opinion to suggest either that
the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" the provisions of the Fourth, or that
the "liberty" assured by the Fourteenth Amendment is, with respect to "privacy,"
necessarily coextensive with the protections afforded by the Fourth. On that
premise, I join the Court's opinion.

75. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
76. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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the potency of guarantees in federal courts in order to accommodate
the diversity of our federal system. I reiterate what I said in dissent in Duncan, 391 U.S., at 175-176: "[N]either history nor
sense supports using the Fourteenth Amendment to put the States
in a constitutional straitjacket with respect to their own development in the administration of criminal and civil law." Since we
now witness the first major attempt to wriggle free of that "strait
jacket," it is appropriate, I think, to step back and view in perspective how far the incorporation doctrine has taken us, and to
put the spotlight on a constitutional revolution that has inevitably
become obscured by the process of case-by-case adjudication."
Justice Harlan not only pointed out the historical incorrectness
of the incorporation theory; he also indicated his preference for state
diversity rather than federal conformity. He favored carrying forward
the Holmes-Brandeis concept of the states as experimental laboratories.
In his dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stewart joined, in Duncan
v. Louisiana,7" where the Court, under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, held the sixth amendment provision for trial
by jury in all criminal prosecutions applicable to the states, he wrote:
In sum, there is a wide range of views on the desirability of
trial by jury, and on the ways to make it most effective when it
is used; there is also considerable variation from State to State
in local conditions such as the size of the criminal caseload, the
ease or difficulty of summoning jurors, and other trial conditions
bearing on fairness. We have before us, therfore, an almost perfect
example of a situation in which the celebrated dictum of Mr.
Justice Brandeis should be invoked. It is, he said, "one of the
happy incidents of -the federal system that a single courageous
"
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory ....
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311

(dissenting opinion)

....

79

77. Id. at 129-30. Other of Justice Harlan's concurring and dissenting opinions
are: Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 19 (1970) (concurring opinion) ; Dickey v.
Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 38 (1970) (concurring opinion); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436, 448 (1970) (concurring opinion) ; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 801 (1969)
(dissenting opinion) ; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 769 (1969) (concurring
opinion); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 744 (1969) (concurring and dissenting opinion) ; Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 726 (1968) (concurring opinion);
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 89 (1967) (dissenting opinion); Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 80 (1964) (concurring opinion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (concurring opinion).
78. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
79. Id. at 193. In the concluding paragraph of his dissenting opinion in Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921), Justice Holmes commented:
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social
experiments that an important part of the community desires, in the insulated
chambers afforded by the several States, even though the experiments may seem
futile or even noxious to me and to those whose judgments I most respect.
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In Roth v. United States,"° where Justice Harlan took the position
that the states have somewhat more leeway in dealing with obscenity
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment than the
federal government has under the first amendment, he argued:
Not only is the federal interest in protecting the Nation
against pornography attenuated, but the dangers of federal censorship in this field are far greater than anything the State may do. It
has often been said that one of the great strengths of our federal
system is that we have, in the forty-eight States, forty-eight experimental social laboratories. State statutory law reflects predominantly this capacity of a legislature to introduce novel techniques
of social control. The federal system has immense advantage of
providing forty-eight separate centers for such experimentation.
Different States will have different attitudes toward the same
work of literature. The same book which is freely read in one
State might be classed as obscene in another. (To give only a
few examples: Edmund Wilson's "Memoirs of Hecate County"
was found obscene in New York . . . ; a bookseller indicted
for selling the same book was acquitted in California. "God's
Little Acre" was held to be obscene in Massachusetts, not obscene
in New York and Pennsylvania.) And it seems to me that no
overwhelming danger to our freedom to experiment and to gratify
our tastes in literature is likely to result from the suppression of
a borderline book in one of the States, so long as there is no
uniform nation-wide suppression of the book, and so long as
other States are free to experiment with the same or bolder books.
Quite a different situation is presented, however, where the
Federal Government imposes the ban. The danger is perhaps
not great if the people of one State, through their legislature,
decide that "Lady Chatterley's Lover" goes so far beyond the
acceptable standards of candor that it will be deemed offensive
and non-sellable, for the State next door is still free to make its
own choice. At least we do not have one uniform standard. But
the dangers to free thought and expression are truly great if the
Federal Government imposes a blanket ban over the Nation on
such a book. The prerogative of the States to differ on their
ideas of morality will be destroyed, the ability of States to experiment will be stunted. The fact that the people of one State cannot
read some of the works of D. H. Lawrence seems to me, if not
wise or desirable, at least acceptable. But that no person in the
United States should be allowed to do so seems to me to be
intolerable, and violative of both the letter and spirit of the
First Amendment.
I judge this case, then, in view of what I think is the
attenuated federal interest in this field, in view of the very real
80. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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danger of a deadening uniformity which can result from nationwide federal censorship, and in view of the fact that the constitutionality of this conviction must be weighed against the First
and not the Fourteenth Amendment .... 81
Not only did Justice Harlan argue for state diversity rather than
federal conformity; he also warned that incorporation would result in
a weakening of federal standards in order to accommodate the states,
2
which is, of course, what happened in Williams v. Florida,1
as Justice
Harlan, in his concurring opinion, pointed out:
Today's decisions demonstrate a constitutional schizophrenia
born of the need to cope with national diversity under the constraints of the incorporation doctrine. In Baldwin the Court
overrides the consideration of local needs, but in Williams it
seeks out a minimum standard to avoid causing disruption in
numerous instances even though, a priori, incorporation would
surely require a jury of 12. The six-man, six-month rule of
today's decisions simply reflects the lowest common denominator
in the scope and function of the right to trial by jury in this
country, but the circumstance that every jurisdiction except New
York City has a trial by a jury for offenses punishable by six
months in prison obscures the variety of opinion that actually
exists as to the proper place for the jury in the administration
of justice ....
It is time, I submit, for this Court to face up to the reality
implicit in today's holdings and reconsider the "incorporation"
doctrine before its leveling tendencies further retard development
in the field of criminal procedure by stifling flexibility in the
States and 8 3by discarding the possibility of federal leadership
by example.

At the end of the Court's term in June 1969, it seemed that
Justice Harlan's voice against selective incorporation was nearly alone,
and that the cause for historical accuracy, so far as the meaning of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was concerned,
was lost. Then came the seating of two new members of the Court,
81. Id. at 505-07 (footnote omitted). Edmund Wilson's MEMOIRS OF HECATE
was found obscene in Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948),
affirming by an evenly divided court 297 N.Y. 687, 77 N.E.2d 6 (1947) affirming
272 App. Div. 799, 71 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1947) (mem.) ; but was ruled not olbscene and
therefore importable by federal customs officials in California. Erskine Caldwell's
GoD's LITTLE ACRE was held obscene in Attorney General v. Book Named "God's
Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281, 93 N.E.2d 819 (1950); but not in People v. Viking
Press, 147 Misc. 813, 264 N.Y.S. 534 (Sup. Ct. 1933), or Commonwealth v. Gordon,
66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (Phila County C.P. 1949), aff'd sub. nor. Commonwealth v.
Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950).
82. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
COUNTY

83. Id. at 136, 138.
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Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun; and Williams v. Florida,4
in which, however, Justice Blackmun did not participate.
V.

THE BURGER COURT

Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Williams v. Florida5
and dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. New York,86 expressed himself
as in substantial agreement with Justice Harlan and characterized
Justice Black's incorporation theory as "that erroneous constitutional
doctrine." 87 He also thought that Justice Harlan was surely right
when he said that "it is time for the Court to face up to reality." 8
In addition, he wrote:
The "incorporation" theory postulates the Bill of Rights as
the substantive metes and bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I think this theory is incorrect as a matter of constitutional
history, and that as a matter of constitutional law it is both
stultifying and unsound. It is, at best, a theory that can lead
the Court only to a Fourteenth Amendment dead end. And, at
worst, the spell of the theory's logic compels the Court either to
impose intolerable restrictions upon the constitutional sovereignty
of the individual States in the administration of their own
criminal law, or else intolerably to relax the explicit restrictions
that the Framers actually did put upon the Federal government
in the administration of criminal justice. .8...9

Thus, two justices now regard Justice Black's incorporation
theory as historically incorrect. In addition, the two new members
of the Court, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, accept
Justice Harlan's approach to federal-state relations, at least in part.
For instance, Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion in
California v. Green,90 where the Court held that the confrontation
clause in the sixth amendment does not preclude the introduction of
an out-of-court declaration taken under oath and subject to cross examination to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein when
the declarant is available to testify at trial, stated:
I add this comment only to emphasize the importance of allowing
the States to experiment and innovate, especially in the area of
criminal justice. If new standards and procedures are tried in
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Id.
399 U.S. 66 (1970).
Id. at 144.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 143.
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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one State their success or failure will be a guide to others and

to the Congress.
The circumstances of this case demonstrate again that neither
the Constitution as originally drafted, nor any amendment, nor
indeed any need, dictates that we must have absolute uniformity
in the criminal law in all the States. Federal authority was never
intended to be a "ramrod" to compel conformity to nonconstitutional standards.9 1
In his dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. New York,92 he
added:
I find it somewhat disconcerting that with the constant urging
to adjust ourselves to being a "pluralistic society" - and I accept
this in its broad sense - we find constant pressure to conform
to some uniform pattern on the theory -that the Constitution
commands it. . . .93

In a state obscenity case, Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harlan joined,
Hoyt v. Minnesota,94 wrote -that he was in general agreement with
Justice Harlan's views in this area:
I am not persuaded that the First and Fourteenth Amendments necessarily prescribe a national and uniform measure

-

rather than one capable of some flexibility and resting on concepts
of reasonableness - of what each of our several States constitutionally may do to regulate obscene products within its borders.
At this still, for me, unsettled stage in the development of state
law of obscenity in the federal constitutional context I find myself
generally in accord with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan
in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496, 500-03 (1957);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203-04 (1964); and Memoirs
v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455-58, 460 (1966), and with
those enunciated by the Chief Justice in Cain v. Kentucky, 397
U.S. 319 (1970), and in Walker v. Ohio, supra.95
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 171, 171-72.
399 U.S. 66 (1970).
Id. at 77.
399 U.S. 524 (1970).

95. Id. at 524, 525. In Walker v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 434, 434 (1970), Chief Justice

Burger, in dissent wrote:
I dissent from such a summary disposition, not only for the reasons expressed
in my separate opinion in Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970), but also because
I find no justification, constitutional or otherwise, for this Court's assuming the
role of a supreme and unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, subjectively judging each piece of material brought before it without regard to the
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To these circumstances must be added one other. Chief Justice

Burger is not as firmly committed to stare decisis as is Justice Harlan.
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissenting opinion in Coleman v. Alabama,96
where the Court held that the sixth and fourteenth amendments
required counsel at an Alabama preliminary hearing, announced:
With deference, then, I am bound to reject categorically
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN'S and MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S

thesis that

what the Court said lately controls over the Constitution. While
our holdings are entitled to deference I will not join in employing
recent cases rather than the Constitution, to bootstrap ourselves
into a result, even though I agree with the objective of having
counsel at preliminary hearings. By placing a premium on "recent
cases" rather than the language of the Constitution, the Court
makes it dangerously simple for future Courts, using the technique
of interpretation, to operate as a "continuing Constitutional
97
convention."
Indeed, Justice Harlan himself has weakened on stare decisis
insofar as Duncan v. Louisiana8 is concerned. In his dissenting
opinion in Baldwin v. New York99 and concurring opinion in Williams
v. Florida,"' he wrote:
In taking that course in Baldwin, I cannot, in a matter that
goes to the very pulse of sound constitutional adjudication, consider myself constricted by stare decisis....
The principle of stare decisis is multifaceted. It is a solid
foundation for our legal system; yet care must be taken not to
use it to create an unmovable structure. It provides the stability
and predictability required for the ordering of human affairs over
the course of time and a basis of "public faith in the judiciary
as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments." . . . Woodenly

applied, however, it builds a stockade of precedent that confines
the law by rules, ill-conceived when promulgated, or if sound in
origin, unadaptable to present circumstances. No precedent is
sacrosanot and one should not hesitate to vote to overturn this
Court's previous holdings -

old or recent -

or reconsider

findings or conclusions of other courts, state or federal. That is not one of the
purposes for which this Court was established.
In Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319, 319 (1970), Chief Justice Burger in

dissent stated:
In my view we should not inflexibly deny to each of the States the power to
adopt and enforce its own standards as to obscenity and pornographic materials;
States ought to be free to deal with varying conditions and problems in this area.
I am unwilling to say that Kentucky is without power to bar public showing of
this film; therefore, I would affirm the judgment from which the appeal is taken.
96. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
97. Id. at 22-23.
98. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
99. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
100. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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settled dicta where the principles announced prove either practically . . . unworkable, or no longer suited to contemporary
life .... Indeed, it is these considerations that move me to depart

today from the framework of Duncan. It is, in part, the disregard
of stare decisis in circumstances where it should apply, to which
the Court is, of necessity, driven in Williams by the "incorporation" doctrine, that leads me to decline to follow Duncan. Surely
if the principle of stare decisis means anything in the law, it
means that precedent should not be jettisoned when the rule of
yesterday remains viable, creates no injustice, and can reasonably
be said to be no less sound than the rule sponsored by those who
seek change, let alone incapable of being demonstrated wrong.
The decision in Williams, however, casts aside workability and
relevance and substitutes uncertainty. The only reason I can
discern for today's decision that discards numerous judicial pronouncements and historical precedent that sound constitutional
interpretation would look to as controlling, is the Court's disquietude with the tension between the jurisprudential consequences
wrought by "incorporation" in Duncan and Baldwin and the
counter-pulls of the situation in Williams which presents the
prospect of invalidating the common practice in the States of
providing less than a 12-member jury for the trial of misdemeanor
0
cases.' '
As one amasses these circumstances - the historical incorrectness
of the incorporation theory; two Justices, Harlan and Stewart, who
recognize the historical incorrectness of the incorporation theory; a
Chief Justice, Burger, who shares Justice Harlan's approach to federalstate relations; two Justices, Burger and Blackmun, who are in general
agreement with Justice Harlan's views in state obscenity cases; a
Chief Justice, Burger, who is not as firmly committed to stare decisis
as is Justice Harlan; and Justice Harlan himself weakening in his
views on stare decisis on the issue of jury trials in state criminal
cases - one begins to have hope that the Court will abandon selective
incorporation along with the incorporation theory and return to a
case-by-case application of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
If the Court does so, this will not mean that the Warren Court
gave a liberal construction to the Constitution, and the Burger Court
101. Id. at 118, 127-29. In United States v. Oregon, 39 U.S.L.W. 4027 (Dec. 21,
1970), where the Court held that the provisions of the Voting Rights Acts Amendments of 1970 fixing the voting age at 18 are constitutional in national elections but
not in state and local elections, Justice Harlan, who felt that these provisions were
unconstitutional even as to national elections, stated with reference to the Court's
one-man one-vote course which began with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962):
Concluding, as I have, that such decisions cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny,
I think it my duty to depart from them, rather than to lend my support to perpetuating their constitutional error in the name of stare decisis.

39 U.S.L.W. at 4027.
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a strict one.1 °2 It will mean only that the Count is at long last turning
its back on incorrect history and abandoning what Justice Stewart,
in his dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. New York'03 and concurring
opinion in Williams v. Florida,'" termed a "mechanistic"'0 5 approach
to the fourteenth amendment. Nor will it mean that the Court will
overrule many of its recent cases; it will not. It will simply put them
on a case-by-case due process basis. However, a few, such as Baldwin
v. New York' 0 6 and Duncan v. Louisiana'° may fall.
VI.

CASE-BY-CASE

DUE

PROCESS

Long before Justice Black announced his incorporation theory
0 " and
in his dissent in Adamson v. California,'
even during the sway
of the Court's selective incorporation doctrine, the Court had no difficulty in applying the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
on a case-by-case basis; it did so in case after case. After all, this is
the method of the common law.
In 1897, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago,"9
the Court, in an opinion by the first Justice Harlan, concluded that a
state could not authorize the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation, because of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
Subsequently, in Twining v. New Jersey,"0 where the Court sustained a state court practice permitting comment on a defendant's failing
to take the stand, Justice Moody speaking for the Court observed:
[I]t is possible -that some of the personal rights safeguarded by
the first eight amendments against National action may also be
safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would
be a denial of due process of law. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad v. Chicago. .

.

. If this is so, it is not because those

rights are enumerated in the first eight amendments, but because

102. In any event, the words liberal and narrow can be made to mean almost anything. For example, in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 14 (1970), Justice Douglas,
in joining in Justice Brennan's opinion, stated that 'a strict construction of the
Constitution" requires the application of the sixth amendment to the states. Id. at 14.
This led Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66, 143 (1970) and concurring opinion in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78,
143 (1970) to comment, "[a]nd this statement is made in the name of 'strict construction of the Constitution' !" Id. at 144 n.3.
103. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).

104.
105.
106.
107.

399 U.S. 78 (1970).
Id. at 143.
399 U.S. 78 (1970).
391 U.S. 145 (1968).

108. 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
109. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
110. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception
of due process of law. .... III
In 1915, in Frank v. Mangum" 2 the Court stated by way of
dictum, and in 1923 in Moore v. Dempsey"' held, in an opinion by
Justice Holmes, that a state criminal trial dominated by a mob violated
a defendant's due process rights. Later the same term, in Meyer v.
Nebraska" 4 and Bartels v. Iowa,"' the Court, under the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, struck down state statutes which
forbade the teaching in grade schools of any language other than
English. The Court's opinions were 'by Justice McReynolds. Justices
Holmes and Sutherland dissented. With reference to the due process
clause, Justice McReynolds in Meyer wrote:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
6
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. ....
In 1925 in Pierce v. Society of Sisters," 7 the Court invalidated,
as violative of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, an
Oregon act which required parents and guardians to send children
to public rather than to private schools. The Court, speaking through
Justice McReynolds, reasoned:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
8
public teachers only.'
A week later, in Gitlow v. New York," 9 where the Court sustained
New York's criminal anarchy act, Justice Sanford, in the Court's
opinion, stated by way of dictum:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom
of speech and of the press - which are protected by the First
Amendment from abridgment by Congress - are among the
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 99.
237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915).
261 U.S. 86 (1923).
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
262 U.S. 404 (1923).
262 U.S. at 399.
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 535.
268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment
120
by the States.

One will note not only that this statement is dictum, but also that
the Court says nothing about incorporation or selective incorporation
or absorption of the first amendment by the due process clause of
the fourteenth.
In 1927, in Tumey v. Ohio, 2' the Court, in a unanimous opinion
by Chief Justice Taft, held that a defendant, under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, is entitled to a fair trial before
a fair tribunal.
Five years later, in Powell v. Alabama,2 2 a case arising out of
the Scottsboro prosecutions, the Court held that a defendant in a
capital case was entitled, under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, to counsel. The Court reached this result not because of,
but in spite of the sixth amendment right to counsel. Justice Sutherland,
in the Court's opinion, after quoting from Justice Moody speaking
for the Court in Twining, continued:
While the question has never been categorically determined by
this court, a consideration of the nature of the right and a review
of the expressions of this and other courts, makes it clear that
the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental character. 23
The next year, in Snyder v. Massachusetts,124 the Court, although
sustaining a state conviction, nevertheless said in an opinion by Justice
Cardozo that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
proscribed a state procedure which "offends some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.'

'

25

1

The next year, in Mooney v. Holohan,2 6 the Court in a per
curiam decision, ruled that a state conviction obtained by the knowing
use of perjured testimony violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, for such a procedure "is as inconsistent with
the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result
by intimidation.'

27

120. Id. at 666.
121. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
122. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

123. Id. at 68.
124. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).

125. Id. at 105.
126. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).

127. Id. at 112.
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In the next year, in Brown v. Mississippi,2 8 the Court unanimously held that a coerced confession violated the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. Chief Justice Hughes, for a unanimous
Court, wrote:
It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to
the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions
of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained
as the basis129for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of
due process.
The Court made a case-by-case application of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment without a reference to the specifics
of the first eight amendments, not only before Justice Black announced
his incorporation theory but also after the Court embraced the concept
of selective incorporation. A good illustration is Thompson v. Louisville.'8 ° An elderly Negro was convicted in the Police Court of Louisville, Kentucky of loitering and disorderly conduct, and fined ten
dollars on each charge. The defendant's lawyer said that his client
was arrested on sight because he had earlier annoyed the police by
obtaining a lawyer to defend him against a prior charge. On the
evening in question the defendant went into a cafe to wait for the
bus. Two policemen walked in and, so they testified, saw Thompson
shuffling or patting his foot on the floor in time to music from a
juke box. He was arrested for loitering and when they got him
outside he was, so they said, very argumentative. The Court unanimously invalidated the two fines as violative of due process. Justice
Black wrote the Court's opinion. He stated that it is "a violation
of due process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his
guilt."'' He made no reference whatever to any of the specifics of
the first eight amendments.
The Court has made, and will make, such case-by-case applications
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, as well as the
128. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
129. Id. at 286. The writer, on several occasions, made a presentation on a
case-by-case basis of the Court's results under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 0. ROGGE, THE FIRST AND THE FIFTH 64-75 (1960); Rogge, Concept
of Ordered Liberty - A New Case, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 238, 251-65 (1959) ; Rogge,
A Technique for Change, 11 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 481, 500-68 (1964).
130. 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
131. Id. at 206. Accord, Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 163 (1961), the first
of the sit-in cases to reach the Court, reversing the convictions of sixteen Negro
students for breach of the peace, because the convictions were "so totally devoid of

evidentiary support as to render them unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment"; Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962), ruling
similarly as to six freedom riders, four of whom went into the waiting room customarily reserved for white people at a bus depot in Shreveport, Louisiana, in order to
take a bus to Jackson, Mississippi.
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due process clause of the fifth amendment. In the manner described
18 2
by Justice Miller in the Court's opinion in Davidson v. New Orleans,
an opinion which contains, in the words of Justice Frankfurter, "the
first full-dress discussion"'
of the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause:
[T]here is wisdom, we think, in the ascertaining of the intent
and application of such an important phrase in the Federal Constitution, by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion
as the cases presented for decision shall require, with the reasoning
on which such decisions may be founded .... 134

The Court has made and will make such case-by-case applications
in the manner which Justice Frankfurter comprehensively described
in the concluding paragraph of his concurring opinion in Kingsley
85
Pictures Corp. v. Regents:
Unless I misread the opinion of the Court, it strikes down the
New York Legislation in order to escape the task of deciding
whether a particular picture is entitled to the protection of expression under the Fourteenth Amendment. Such an exercise
of the judicial function, however onerous or ungrateful, inheres
in the very nature of the judicial enforcement of the Due Process
Clause. We cannot escape such instance-by-instance, case-by-case
application of that clause in all the varieties of situations that
come before this Court. It would be comfortable if, by a comprehensive formula, we could decide when a confession is coerced
so as to vitiate a state conviction. There is no such talismanic
formula. Every Term we have to examine the particular circumstances of a particular case in order to apply generalities which
no one disputes. It would be equally comfortable if a general
formula could determine the unfairness of a state trial for want
of counsel. But, except in capital cases, we have to thread our way,
Term after Term, through the particular circumstances of a
particular case in relation to a particular defendant in order to
ascertain whether due process was denied in the unique situation
before us. We are constantly called upon to consider the alleged
misconduct of a prosecutor as vitiating the fairness of a particular
trial or the inflamed state of public opinion in a particular case
as undermining the constitutional right to due process. Again, in
the series of cases coming here from the state courts, in which due
process was invoked to enforce separation of church and state,
decision certainly turned on the particularities of the specific situations before the Court. It is needless to multiply instances. It is
132.
133.
curring
134.
135.

96 U.S. 97 (1878).
Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 691, 697 (1959)
opinion).
96 U.S. at 104.
360 U.S. 684, 691 (1959) (concurring opinion).
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the nature of -the concept of due process, and, I venture to believe,
its high serviceability in our constitutional system, that the judicial enforcement of the Due Process Clause is the very antithesis
of a Procrustean rule. This was recognized in the first full-dress
discussion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, when the Court defined the nature of the problem as a
"gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases
presented for decision may be founded." Davidson v. New Orleans,
96 U.S. 97, 104. The task is onerous and exacting, demanding
as it does the utmost discipline in objectivity, the severest control
of personal predilections. But it cannot be escaped,
not even by
136
disavowing that such is the nature of our task.
Such case-by-case application will have the definiteness which
Justice Cardozo indicated in the Court's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut :187
The line of division may seem to be wavering and broken if
there is a hasty catalogue of the cases on the one side and the other.
Reflection and analysis will induce a different view. There emerges
the perception of a rationalizing principle which gives to discrete
instances a proper order and coherence.

....

138

Such case-by-case application will have the definiteness which
Justice Frankfurter indicated in the Court's opinion in Rochin v.
California:...

The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave
judges at large. We may not draw on our merely personal and
private notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in their
judicial function. Even though the concept of due process of law is
not final and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations
that are fused in the whole nature of our judicial process. See
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process; The Growth of
the Law; The Paradoxes of Legal Science. These are considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of
the legal profession. The Due Process Clause places upon this
Court the duty of exercising a judgment, within the narrow
confines of judicial power in reviewing State convictions, upon
interests of society pushing in opposite directions. 4
Justice Black, singling out the language in Twining v. New
Jersey'4' for his attack, characterizes it as a return to theories of
136. Id. at 696-97. '
137. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

138. Id. at 325.

139. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
140. Id. at 170-71.
141. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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natural law.' 42 But Justice Frankfurter is right in his response in the
4
Court's opinion in Rochin v. California1
3 on the case-by-case application of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause: "Due process
of law thus conceived is not to be derided as resort to a revival of
'natural law.' "144 The case-by-case application of the concept of
due process not only antedates Justice Black's incorporation theory,
but also the natural law theories with which he now seeks to identify
it; for the concept goes back to the concept of law of the land in
the Magna Charta, as Justice Black himself recognized in his dissenting
opinion in In re Winship.145 Soon after Bracton, litigants began to
insist that courts control acts of the crown, and the courts started
doing so. Thus began the concept of judicial review. For centuries,
more than half a millennium, courts in the Anglo-American judicial
system have been using judicial review on a case-by-case basis in
order to assure due process of law.
A brief history of these two concepts, due process and judicial
review, will show that they are part and parcel of our legal system,
and have been for centuries.
VII.

LAW OF THE LAND

After Henry II in 1178 appointed five judges for the whole kingdom and told them "to do right judgment,"' 4 6 there was sufficient
legal development so that when a generation later his son John,
Richard I's brother and successor, misused his powers, the result
was the Magna Charta. Therein King John promised his barons:
No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled,
or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send
upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or [per
legem terrae] by the law of the land.' 47
In the next clause he promised: "To no one will we sell, to no
one will we refuse or delay, right or justice."' 4 Clause 45 provided:
"We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs only such
as know the law of the realm and mean to observe it well.' 149 The
142. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 69, 70 (1947)

(dissenting

opinion).
143. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
144. Id. at 171.
145. 397 U.S. 358, 378, 379 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
146. 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 482 (D. Douglas & G. Greenaway eds.
1953).
147. W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CHARTA 375 (2d ed. 1914).
148. Id. at 395.
149. Id. at 431.
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country had experienced judicial craftsmanship and the barons insisted
on maintaining it.
Moreover, an extraordinary procedure was established for enforcing the Magna Charta's terms. Clause 61 provided for a com-

mittee of twenty-five barons. If there were any infractions, four of the
twenty-five were to be notified and they in turn were to intimate
such violations to the king or if he was absent from the kingdom to
his justiciar. If the situation was not corrected in forty days the
remedy was that:
[T]hose five- and- twenty barons shall, together with the community of the whole land, distrain and distress us in all possible
ways, namely, by seizing our castles, lands, possessions, and in
any other way they can, until redress has been obtained as they
deem fit, saving harmless our own person, and the persons of
our queen and children; and when redress has been obtained,
they shall resume their old relations toward us. 5 °
King John declared, "They have given me 25 over kings!"151
52
After another generation, Bracton, in his Tractatus de legibus'
the main part of which was probably written between 1250-1258,
could state at one place that the king was under God and the law;
and at another, add that the king's superiors included his court. At
one place Bracton wrote:
But the king himself ought not to be under any man, but
under God and under the law, for the law makes the king.1" 3
At another he added:
The king has a superior, God, for example. Likewise the law,
through which he has been made king. Likewise his court,
namely counts and barons because the counts are so called as
being as it were the associates of the king, and he who has
an associate, has a master. And therefore if the king be without
a bridle, that is without law, they ought to put a bridle upon
him, unless they themselves are together with the king without
a bridle ....154
150.
151.
152.
1922).

Id. at 467.
1 A. BRYANT, THE STORY OF ENGLAND 301 (1954).
2 H. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE (G. Woodbine ed.
This was the second great treatise on English law. The first was R.
GLANVILLE, TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS, probably written between 1187-1189, before

Henry II's death.

153. BRACTON, supra note 152, at 33 (F. 5b). "Ipse autem rex non debet esse
sub homine sed sub deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem."
154. Id. at 110 (F. 34). "Rex habet superiorem, deum scilicet. Item legem per
quam factus est rex. Item curiam suam, videlicet comites et barones, quia comites
dicuntur quasi socii regis, et qui socium habet, habet magistrum. Et ideo si rex
fuerit sine fraeno, id est sine lege, debent ei fraenum apponere nisi imsimet fuerint
cum rege sine fraeno."
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If the king refused to obey the law, correction would come in the
form of the Lord's vengence, and it might also possibly be "that the
community of the realm and the baronage ought to do this and may do
it in the court of the king himself,"1 5 which is of course what the
English people sought to do under Oliver Cromwell to King Charles
I in 1649.
VIII.

CONTROLLING ACTS OF THE CROWN

Not long after Bracton, litigants began to suggest that acts of the
king would not subvert the common law. In 1291 it was urged "that
a writ, framed and specially conceded by the king's grace, does not
abrogate a writ of common law."'5 0 The next year the position was
taken that a royal grant was invalid because the grant was based on a
deed which was contrary to common law, "especially as the lord king
15 7
had no wish by that grant to change the common law of his realm."'
Almost from the start, the Year Books 5 8 contained hints that
the king was under the law, and had to act in accordance with it. 150 In
1338 in the reign of Edward III the court granted replevin against a
deputy collector because the warrant pursuant to which he had distrained certain cattle had not been under seal. 6 ° The next year the
court told a sheriff that he could not justify a refusal to execute a
writ of outlawry by showing a private letter from the king to the
effect that he had pardoned the offenders.'' If the king wanted to
pardon, he had to do so in the way prescribed by law. From the
reign of Henry IV to the reign of James I there was a long succession of cases in which the courts, in instances where the crown as
parens patriae attempted to make the royal power a source of revenue
or a means of enriching favorites, insisted that it be exercised according to law. 62 The best known example is The Case of Monopolies,
Darcy v. Allen,' 63 in which the court near the close of Elizabeth I's
reign held voia a monopoly which she granted to one Darcy, a
groom of the Privy Chamber, for the importation as well as the
manufacture and sale of playing cards. Elizabeth I made many such
155. 3 Id. at 43 F. 171b. "... . quod universitas regni et baronagium suum hoc facere
possit et debeat in curia ipsius regis."

156. 2 Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench Under Edward I, in 57 SELDEN
58, 59 (G. Sayles ed. 1938).
157. Id. at 67, 68.
158. Casus Placitorum and Reports of Cases in the King's Courts 1272-1278, in
69 SELDEN SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS lXV (H. Dunham ed. 1952).
159. See, e.g., Y.B. 21 & 22 Edw. 1, no. 54, 56 (Rolls Series) (1293).
160. Y.B. Mich. 12 & 13 Edw. 3, no. 23, 54 (Rolls Series) (1338).
161. Reginald de Nerford's Case, Y.B. Hil. 13 & 14 Edw. 3, n. 54, 332-35 (Rolls
Series) (1339-1340).
162. R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 69 (1921).
163. 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B. 1602).
SOCIETY PUBLICATIONS

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1971

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 16: p. 411

grants. Allen was a freeman of London and influential Londoners
actively encouraged him to oppose the monopoly.
IX.

CONTROLLING ACTS OF PARLIAMENT

The judges relied upon the common law, not only to control acts
of the crown, but even acts of Parliament. Again, there is a line of
authorities, upon many of which Sir Edward Coke relied.
The Statute of Westminster the Second (1285)164 provided that
the right of action in cessavit was to descend from a lord to his heir;
but in Copper v. Gederings,'65 Chief Justice Bereford refused to follow the act on the ground that to do so would disturb certain general
principles of the common law. This ruling was repeated half a
century later in Cessavit 42,66 which was regarded in authoritative
sources as the final word on the point.' 67
The Statute of Carlisle (1307) required the common seal of religious houses to be in the keeping of the prior (who was under the
abbot) and four others; or else any deed sealed with it was void. 6 '
But in a case in which an abbot challenged a deed of annuity of his
predecessor on the ground of the statute, "the opinion of the COURT
was that this statute is void for it is [impartinent] not feasible to be
observed."' 6 9
An act of Parliament seized the lands of alien monasteries into the
king's hands. But in The Prior of Castle Acre v. The Dean of St.
Stephen's, 7 ° in the reign of Henry VII, involving a suppressed priory
which was "parson" of a church, a majority of the court of common
pleas held that this act could not make the king a parson. Chief Justice
Frowyke concluded: "So a temporal act without the assent of the
Supreme Head cannot make the king parson."
Then came the suppression of the monasteries' 7 ' under Henry
VIII and of the chantries 72 under his son and successor, Edward VI.
The issue involved whether the king could continue to charge the
Church and colleges rent after he had seized their property and
164. 13 Edw. 1, c. 21 (1285) (repealed).
165. Y.B. 3 Edw. 2, 105 (1310).
166. A. FITZ-HERBERT, GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT (1565).
167. NATURA BREVIUM clvii d (1553); A. FITZ-HERBERT, NATURA BREVIUM [2091
(481) (M. Hale ed. 1755) ; see Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40
HARV. L. REV. 30, 36 (1926).

168. 35 Edw. 1, c. 4 (1307) (repealed).
169. Y.B. Pasch. 27 Hen. 6 (1449), in 1 STATHAM ABRIDGEMENT 114 (M. Klingelsmith ed. 1915) (Annuitie 11). This case is also noted in A. FITZ-HERBERT, GRAUNDE
ABRIDGEMENT (Annuitie 41).
170. Y.B. Hil. 21 Hen. 7, 1-5 (1506).
171. An Acte for dissoluoan of Abbeys, 31 Hen. 8, c. 13, § 4 (1539).
172. An Acte whereby certaine Chantries Colleges Free Chapelle, 1 Edw. 6, c. 14,
§ 17 (1547).
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devised it to others. A group of cases under Elizabeth I beginning
with Anonymous 17 8 in 1572 and ending with Strowd's Case174 three
years later, where the question was finally settled, decided that the
original rent obligations became extinct and raised rent charges instead
against the king's grantee.
The judges reached this result because, in their view, the act of
Parliament would otherwise have been absurd. In other words, if acts
of Parliament disturbed the general principles of the common law,
or were not feasible to be performed, or were absurd, the judges
either ignored them, or construed them to accord with the common
law. In the case of the act which was "impartinent" to be observed,
the court expressed the opinion that it was void.
X.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW

In the course of time, the concept law of the land came also
to mean due process of law. King John's successors confirmed and
reissued the Magna Charta, sometimes repeatedly. Edward III (13271377), in addition to his frequent confirmations of the Magna Charta,
in 1354 further provided:
that no man of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put
out of land or tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer [par
due proces de lei] by due process of the law." 5
Thus the phrase -

due process of law

-

came into being.

Coke equated the two: "[B]y the law of the land (that is, to
speak it once for all) by the due course, and process of law."' 70 We in
this country have made the same identification. Our earlier state constitutions usually used the phrase, by the law of the land. 77 Daniel
173. 73 Eng. Rep. 709 (K.B. 1572).
174. 74 Eng. Rep. 715 (K.B. 1575).
175. The Statute of the Twenty-Eighth Year of King Edward III, 28 Edw. 3,
c. 3 (1354).
176. 2 Inst. * 46. See also 2 id. at * 50. His reference in the latter place to 37 Edw.
3, c. 8 (1363) is to A Statute Concerning Diet and Apparel, 37 Edw. 3, c. 18 (1363).
177. E.g., DEL. CONST. art. I. § 7 (1792), art. I, § 7 (1831) ("unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land") ; ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 8 (1818), art.
XIII, § 8 (1848) ("but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land") ; MD.
Declaration of Rights art. 21 (1776), art. 21 (1851), art. 23 (1864), art. 23 (1867)
("by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land") ; MAss. Declaration of
Rights art. 12 (1780) ("but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land") ;
N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1821), art. I, § 1 (1846) ("unless by the law of the land
or the judgment of his peers") ; N.C. CoNST., Declaration of Rights § 12 (1776),
art. I, § 17 (1868), art. I, § 17 (1876) ("but by the law of the land") ; PA. CONST.,
Declaration of Rights § 9 (1776) ("except by the law of the land, or the judgment
of his peers"), art. IX, § 9 (1790), art. IX, § 9 (1838), art. I, § 9 (1874) ("unless
by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land") ; S.C. CONST. art. 41 (1778),
art. IX, § 2 (1790) ("but by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land"),
art. I, § 14 (1868) ("but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land");
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Webster, in his argument in the Supreme Court in the Dartmouth
College17 case identified the law of the land provision in the New
Hampshire Constitution with due process:
One prohibition is "that no person shall be . . . deprived of his

life, liberty, or estate, but by judgment of his peers, or the law
of the land." . . . Have the plaintiffs lost their franchises by

"due course and process of law?"
.. . By the law of the land is most clearly intended, the general
law. . . . The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life,

liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection of the
179
general rules which govern society ....
,Conversely, the federal Supreme Court in Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 8 ' its first major decision under
the due process clause of the fifth amendment in a case challenging
action of the federal government, equated that clause with the law of
the land:
The words, "due process of law," were undoubtedly intended to
convey the same meaning as the words, "by the law of the land,"
in Magna Charta. Lord Coke in his commentary on those words,
(2 Inst. 50), says they mean due process of law. The constitutions
which have been adopted by the several States before the formation
of the federal constitution, following the language of the great
charter more closely, generally contained the words, "but by the
judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."''
XI.

EDWARD COKE

Coke gave added meaning to judicial review. In 1608 he became
so bold as to tell James I that the king was under the law. The
occasion was a Sunday morning conference which arose out of the comVT. CONST. ch. I, § 11 (1786), ch. I, § 10 (1793)

("except by the laws of the land,
or the judgment of his peers") ; VA. Bill of Rights § 8 (1776), § 8 (1850), CoNST.
art. I, § 10 (1870) ("except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers").
178. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
179. Id. at 561, 581.
180. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
181. Id. at 276. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908), the Court
through Justice Moody explained:
There are certain general principles well settled, however, which narrow the field
of discussion and may serve as helps to correct conclusions. These principles
grow out of the proposition universally accepted by American courts on the
authority of Coke, that the words "due process of law" are equivalent in meaning
to the words "law of the land," contained in . . . Magna Charta. .
In a yet later case, Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1926), the Court said:
"What it [due process clause] does require is that state action, whether through one
agency or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions and not infrequently are designated as 'law of the land'."
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plaint of Richard Bancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury, about the number of writs of prohibition which the Court of Common Pleas under
Coke as Chief Justice issued against the Court of High Commission.
Coke's court issued these writs in order to confine the jurisdiction of
the High Commission and thus limit the use of its inquisitional procedure. On this complaint, the king assembled the judges before him.
He took the position that he in his own person could decide any cause
and therefore he could delegate it to the High Commission. Then, according to Coke in his Prohibitionsdel Roy,'1 2 the following occurred:
To which it was answered by me, in the presence, and with the
clear consent of all the Judges of England, and Barons of the
Exchequer, that the King in his own person cannot adjudge any
case, .... but this ought to be determined and adjudged in
some Court of Justice, according to the law and custom of
England; . . . then the King said, that he thought the law was

founded upon reason, and that he and others had reason, as well
as the Judges: to which it was answered by me, that true it was,
that God had endowed His Majesty with excellent science, and
great endowments of nature; but his Majesty was not learned
in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which concern
the life or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are
not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial [i.e.
studied] reason and judgment of law, which law is an act which
requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain
to the cognizance of it: that the law was the golden met-wand
and measure to try the cause of the subjects; and which protected his Majesty in safety and peace: with which the King
was greatly offended, and said, that then he should be under the
law, which was treason to affirm, as he said; to which I said
that Bracton saith, quod Rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub
Deo et lege [that the King himself ought not to be under any
man, but under God and under the law].'
Coke's account contains his own heavy gloss. James would never
have permitted without interruption the long speeches which Coke
attributed to himself.
From Sir Julius Caesar and various newsletters, it appears that
at some point James broke in and told Coke he "spoke foolishly."
Himself, the King, as supreme head of justice, would defend to the
death his prerogative of calling judges before him to decide
disputes of jurisdiction. Moreover he would "ever protect the
common law."
"The common law," Coke interjected, "protecteth the King."
182. 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (K.B. 1608).
183. Id. at 65, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1342-43.
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"A traitorous speech !" James shouted. "The King protecteth
the law and not the law the King. The King maketh judges
and bishops. If the judges interpret the law themselves and suffer
none else to interpret them, they may easily make, of the law,
shipmen's hose." At this point James shook his fist and Sir Julius
Caesar, after one brief sentence, stopped taking notes." 4
Robert Cecil interceded for Coke and the king was finally mollified.
But if Coke grovelled before James, what is even more important than his grovelling is the fact that he insisted that the king
was under the law.
After Coke, the idea that the king was under the law spread in
England. When Charles I was attempting to collect his ship money
in 1638, a constable "prating and grumbling much, uttered these
speeches" against it, as reported to the principal lieutenant of Archbishop Laud: "4. Said the king was under a law as much as any subject, and that he could do nothing of himself without his subjects. 5.
He confessed that some judges determined it to be law, but the best and
most honest had not."'8 5 The constable belonged to the growing middle
class in England, whose members dared to oppose the king.
Coke made equally plain that the acts of Parliament were likewise
8 6
subject to judicial review. This was in Dr. Bonham's Case,1
who was
a doctor of medicine of the University of Cambridge, and who was
fined and later imprisoned by the Royal College of Physicians for
practicing medicine without a license from it. Under the Royal College's letters patent, confirmed by statute, half of the fine went to it.
But this made it a judge in its own case, which was contrary, according to Coke, to an established maxim of the common law. He declared:
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law
will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to
be utterly void: For when an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act

to be void; .

. .",187

Although Coke's view on this point was not to prevail in England,
it did in the United States.
However, Coke's view had strong support even in England. When
James I promoted Coke in 1613 to the less desirable, although more
dignified, position of Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench, Coke's
184. C.

BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE

185. A.

FRENCH, CHARLES

I

305-06 (1956).

AND THE PURITAN UPHEAVAL 209

(1955).

186. 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1610).
187. Id. at 652.
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successor in the common pleas, Sir Henry Hobart, espoused Coke's
view. In Day v. Savadge,l's Chief Justice Hobart stated that "even an
Act of Parliament made against Natural Equity, as to make a Man
Judge in his own Cause, is void in itself, . . . ."'8' The next year
in Lord Sheffield v. Ratcliffe,190 he spoke more generally:
If you ask me, then, by what rule the judges guided themselves in
this diverse exposition of the self same word and sentence? I
answer it was by that liberty and authority that Judges have over
laws, especially over statute laws, according to reason and best
convenience, to mould them to the truest and best use, . . ."9
But Coke's view of the supremacy of the common law created a
problem, for the king's prerogative was part of the common law, as
the court held shortly before the Revolution of 1688 in Godden v.
Hales;.9 2 and the English people had had enough of the king's prerogative. Better the supremacy of Parliament than this, and after
the Revolution of 1688 Parliament did become supreme."9 8
XII.

IN THE COLONIES

In this country, Coke's concept of judicial review encompassed
legislative as well as executive acts. What Coke said about a controlling common law was in accord with what the Colonists read in French
and Dutch publications about natural law. Moreover, in two respects
our circumstances were different from those of the English. For one
thing, we were not concerned about the king's prerogative. Even
more important was the fact that we had written constitutions.
When, in 1684, James II sought to abrogate the charter of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony, the people of Boston were said to "hold
forth a law book, & quote the Authority of the Lord Cook to Justifie
their setting up for themselves; pleading the possession of 60 years
against the right of the Crown."'9 4
188.
189.
190.
191.

80 Eng. Rep. 235 (K.B. 1614).
Id. at 237.
80 Eng. Rep. 475 (K.B. 1615).
Id. at 486.
192. 89 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B. 1686).
193. Even after the Revolution of 1688, Lord Chief Justice Holt declared in City
of London v. Wood, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (K.B. 1701):
And what my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham's Case in his 8. Co. is far from any
extravagancy, for it is a very reasonable and true saying, that if an act of parliament should ordain that the same person should be party and Judge, or, which is
the same thing, Judge in his own cause, it would be a void Act of Parliament....
194. An Account of the Colonys and Provinces of New England in general, More
Particularly of that of the Massachusetts, cited in W. PERRY, PAPERS RELATING To
THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH IN MASSACHUSETTS 39, 42 (1873). The first case in
which a court invalidated a legislative act in this country was even earlier. Giddings v.
Browne (1657), cited in T. HUTCHINSON, COLLECTION OF ORIGINAL PAPERS RELATrVE
To THE HISTORY OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHusErrs-BAY 287 (1769). Justice
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Paxton's Case,'95 decided in 1761, involved the legality of writs
of assistance. Such writs were the chief weapon for the enforcement of
the revenue laws. They were blanket permits issuable to anyone,
authorizing the search of any suspected place. The only limitation was
that the search had to be in the daytime. The advocate general for the
Crown was James Otis. As such, it became his duty to argue for the
validity of these writs, which were authorized by an act of Parliament
in 1662.96 Instead, Otis resigned his office and took the other side
of the case. In a masterful address in which he relied heavily on Coke,
James Otis denounced writs of assistance as "the worst instrument of
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law that ever was found in an English lawbook.' 1 9 7 The judges, almost convinced, sent to England for advice.
In obedience to orders from the ministry, they subsequently recognized
the writs. Although the case was lost, the cause was not. John Adams,
who heard Otis' argument, later wrote:
Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away,
as I did, ready to take up arms against writs of assistance. Then
and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the
arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
98
Independence was born.'
In 1765 came the Stamp Act, which required stamps to be
affixed to most legal documents. Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson of
Massachusetts wrote: "our friends to liberty take the advantage of a
maxim they find in Lord Coke that an Act of Parliament against
Magna Carta or the peculiar rights of Englishmen is ipso facto void."' 9 9
The people's protests led to the resignation of the only official who had
authority to sell the stamps. But this caused a problem for the courts.
Were they to admit unstamped documents in evidence? Hutchinson, in
his "Summary of the Disorders in the Massachusetts Province proceeding from an Apprehension that an Act of Parliament called the Stamp
Act deprives the People of their Natural Rights" reported that a comSymonds of Boston ruled against the act there in question on the ground that it was
"against a fundamental law in nature." Id. at 290. He cited H. FINCH, LAW,
OR A
DISCOURSE THEREOF (1627), and M. DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE (1630).
Finch
began with the starting point that the common law was "nothing els but common
reason." FINCH, supra at 75.
195. Quincy, 51, 401 (Mass. 1761).
196. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c.11, § 5 (1662).

197. See 2

THE WORKS

OF JOHN ADAMS

App. 523 (Chas. Francis Adams ed.

1850) ; W. TUDOR, LIFE OF JAMES OTIS 63 (1823).
198. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor, March 29, 1817, in 8 OLD SOUTH
LEAFLETS 60.
199. 26 Ms. ARCHIVES OF MASSACHUSETTS 153-54 [hereinafter cited as ARCHIVES],
quoted in Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV. 30,
63 (1926).
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mittee of the Massachusetts Assembly proposed a resolve that all courts
should do business without stamps and that "the prevailing reason
at this time is, that the Act of Parliament is against Magna Charta
and the natural rights of Englishmen, and therefore according to Lord
Coke null and void. ' 200 Justice John Cushing continued to have
doubts; but he finally wrote John Adams:
"I can tell the grand jury the nullity of Acts of Parliament, but
must leave it to you to prove it by the more powerful arguments
of the jus gladii divinum, [divine right of the sword] a power not
peculiar -to kings and ministers."
Adams responded: "You have my hearty concurrence in telling the jury about the nullity of Acts of Parliament, whether we
can prove it by the jus gladii, or not. I am determined
to die of
'20 1
that opinion, let the jus gladii say what it will."
In a case in Virginia, Robin v. Hardaway,0 2 some persons of Indian descent sought to vindicate their freedom despite a statute which
reduced them to slavery. Their counsel cited, among other authorities,
Coke's opinion in Dr.Bonham's Case and Hobart's decision in Savadge.
The court ruled for the plaintiffs, but on the ground that the objectionable statute had been repealed.
XIII.

IN THE STATES

When the break between the American Colonies and the mother
country finally came, all the Colonies save one, Rhode Island, following
habits of thought which had origins going back more than five-and-ahalf centuries to the Magna Charta, set forth in written form the structures of their governments and specified various of the rights of the
individual as against the state. Rhode Island continued under its charter
of 1663. All the rest, in the early years of the Revolution, drafted constitutions. Nine - Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Virginia - did so in 1776, the year of the Declaration of Independence;
two -

Georgia and New York -

did so in 1780; Vermont, which

was not one of the original thirteen colonies, drafted a constitution in
1777. Seven of these states - Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia - either
as part of their constitutions or separately, also drafted declarations
or bills of rights. With these written constitutions and bills of rights,
the course of judicial review became even easier.
200. ARCHIVES at 183, quoted in Plucknett, supra note 199, at 63.
201. 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 390-91 (Chas. Francis Adams ed. 1854).
202. Jeff. 109 (Va. 1772).
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The best known case on judicial review in the period prior to the
adoption of the Federal Constitution dealing with the validity of state
legislation is Trevett v. Weedon"3 in Rhode Island. The legislative
act in question imposed penalties on all who refused to take the state's
paper money at its face value, and provided for the summary trial of
offenders without a jury. Weedon was so tried. His lawyer, Major
General Varnum, argued that since the act took away the right of
trial by jury, it was contrary to Magna Charta and fundamental law.
He relied, among his authorities, upon Coke, Hobart, and Vattel.
The court ruled in his favor. Three of the five judges expressed the
opinion that the act was unconstitutional.
Both before and after this case, the courts of other states - New
Jersey, North Carolina and Virginia - held those legislative acts
which were at variance with state constitutions to be unconstitutional. 4
The senior counsel for the successful party in the North Carolina case
was James Iredell, later a justice on the United States Supreme Court.
In defense of his position he wrote a public letter in which he stated:
We felt in all its rigors the mischiefs of an absolute and unbounded authority, claimed by so weak a creature as man, and
should have been guilty of the basest breach of trust, as well as
the grossest folly, if the same moment when we spurned the
insolent despotism of Great Britain, we had established a despotic
power ourselves.20 5
XIV.

UNDER

THE CONSTITUTION

As the quotation from Iredell indicates, judicial review was
implicit in the way the framers of the Constitution separated governmental powers. They were acutely aware of the danger of vesting too
much power in fallible human beings. Accordingly, they constructed
the Constitution along the lines of their understanding of Montesquieu's
classic triple division of governmental functions into legislative, executive, and judicial branches, using their own ideas and those of Montesquieu, John Locke, and James Harrington concerning checks and balances between the different agencies which exercise governmental
power. The three branches were to function in the interest of liberty
by balancing and checking each other. Power was to be a check to
203. (R.I. 1786), 10 RECORDS OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 219 (1865), 2 P.
CHANDLER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL TRIALS 269 (1844), 1 J. THAYER, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (1895).
204. Holmes v. Walton, 4 Halstead 444 (Unreported N.J. 1780); Bayard v.
Singleton, 1 Martin 48 (N.C. 1787); Kamper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cas. 20 (1793);

Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. Rep. 5 (1782) ; cf. Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay 252
(S.C. 1792) ; see Scott, Holmes v. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent, 4 AM. HIST.
REV. 456 (1899).
205. R. COXE,

JUDICIAL POWER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
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power. The concentration of governmental powers, even in a legislative
body, spelled tyranny. As Thomas Jefferson observed:
The concentrating these in the same hand is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these
powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and not by a
single one. 173 despots would surely be as oppressive as one. 20 6
Or, as James Madison wrote:
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judicial, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective,
may justly be pro207
nounced the very definition of tyranny.
However, we do not have to rest upon implication or inference
to demonstrate that the framers of the Constitution and the first amendments counted on judicial review for both legislative. and executive
acts.20 8 Jefferson's letter of March 15, 1789, from Paris, to his friend
Madison in this county, and Madison's statement on June 8, 1789
when he laid his own set of amendments before the first Congress,
affirmatively show such reliance. Jefferson was then our minister to
France.
The Constitution went into operation in 1789, and the first ten
amendments two years later. The fact that the Constitution did not
originally have a bill of rights became the strongest objection to its
ratification. Its supporters countered with the argument that since the
federal government was one of enumerated powers, a bill of rights
was unnecessary; indeed, it might even be dangerous, for it would
furnish some ground for a contention that such an enumeration was
exhaustive. The earliest and leading protagonist of this double-barreled
position was James Wilson of Pennsylvania.2 0 9 Later, Alexander
Hamilton of New York put Wilson's argument in its best-known
form,2 l0 although the last installment of this number did not come from
206. 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 223 (W. Ford ed. 1894).
207. THE FEDERALIST, No. 47, at 336 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison). George
Washington in his Farewell Address cautioned: "The spirit of encroachment tends

to consolidate the powers of all departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the
form of government, a real despotism." 13 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
306 (W. Ford ed. 1892). John Adams, in a letter of November 1775 to Richard Henry
Lee, commented:
It is by balancing each of these three powers against the other two, that the efforts
in human nature towards tyranny can alone be checked and restrained, and any
degree of freedom preserved in the constitution.
4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 185, 186 (Chas. F. Adams ed. 1851).
208. That the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution were familiar with the idea
of judicial review, see C. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1912).
209. See 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 436-37 (2d ed.
1888); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION 156 (W. Ford ed. 1888).
210. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 84, at 531 (B. Wright ed. 1961)

(A. Hamilton).
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the press until after New York, the eleventh state, had ratified the
Constitution. Thus, this particular work had little actual effect upon
the political course of events.
Madison at first espoused Wilson's thesis. 211 However, under the
impact of his correspondence with his friend Jefferson, and the general
demands for a bill of rights, he changed his position and became the
principal draftsman of the first ten amendments.
Jefferson, in his letter of March 15, 1789 to Madison,
wrote:
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one
which has great weight with me, the legal check which it puts
into the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which if rendered
independent and kept strictly to their own department merits great
confidence for their learning and integrity. In fact what degree
of confidence would be too much for a body composed of such men
as Wythe, Blair and Pendleton? On characters like these the
"civium ardor prava jubentium" [frenzy of the citizens bidding
what is wrong] would make no impression. 2
Wythe, Blair and Pendleton were celebrated judges who constituted
Virginia's High Court of Chancery.
Madison studied the proposals of the various states, and prepared
his own set of amendments. He presented these to the House on June
8, 1789. Before he did so, he had probably received Jefferson's letter
of March 15, 1789, for all of Jefferson's letters came by diplomatic
pouch.2 13 In making his presentation, Madison took occasion to meet
the argument that bills of rights were ineffective by pointing to judicial
review:
If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive;
they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights
expressly
stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of
2 14
rights.

The first case in which the Supreme Court invalidated an act of
Congress was not long in coming. That case was not Marbury v.
211. See 3 J. ELLIOT,
212. 14 THE PAPERS

DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 620 (2d ed. 1888).
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659-60 (J. Boyd ed. 1958). The
quotation is from HORACE, ODES, bk. III, ode iii.

213. See Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE L.J. 464, 467
n.12 (1956).
214. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (June 8, 1789) (J. Gales comp. 1834). The portions
of the ANNALS relating to the first ten amendments in the first Congress are reprinted
in B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 100-217 (1955).
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Madison,2 1 as we popularly suppose. Rather, it antedated Marbury v.
Madison by almost a decade. The first case was United States v.
Yale Todd.216 Although Yale Todd was not reported, Chief Justice
Taney, in a footnote inserted in United States v. Ferreira17 at the
direction of the Court, gave the substance of that decision.
Yale Todd arose under a veterans' pension act of 1792.21" This
act gave circuit courts of the United States the duty of examining into
the claims of pensions as invalids of members of our armed forces
during the Revolutionary War and certifying their opinion to the
Secretary of War. The different circuit courts, which included the
Chief Justice and all but one of the five justices of the Supreme Court,
were of the opinion that the act of 1792 was unconstitutional because it
assigned to the circuit courts duties which were not of a judicial
nature. 219 The Circuit Court for the District of New York consisted of
Chief Justice Jay, Justice Cushing and District Judge Duane; the
Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, of Justices Wilson and
Blair, and District Judge Peters; and the Circuit Court for the District
of North Carolina, of Justice Iredell and District Judge Sitgreaves. The
Circuit Court for the District of New York stated:
That by the Constitution of the United States, the government
thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches, and
that it is the duty of each to abstain from, and to oppose, encroachments on either.
That neither the legislative nor the executive branches, can
constitutionally assign to the judicial any duties, but such as are
220
properly judicial, and to be performed in a judicial manner.
But this court did, in an effort to cooperate, give its members the
option of acting as commissioners, but not as judges, in carrying out
the provisions of the act. The Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania, however, respectfully refused to act at all. Accordingly, the
Attorney General made a motion ex officio in the Supreme Court for a
writ of mandamus to compel the Circuit Court for the District of
Pennsylvania to act in the case of one Hayburn. 2 1' The Court denied
the motion. The Attorney General then changed his ground and stated
that he was in court on behalf of Hayburn. This caused the Court to
take the motion under advisement until the next term. In the mean215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220,
221.

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Unreported, 1794.
54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 52 n. (1851).
Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243.
See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410-14 n. (1792).
Id. at 410 n. (emphasis added).
Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 409 (1792).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1971

43

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 1

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

16: p. 411

time, Congress repealed various sections of the Act of 1792,222 but inserted a savings clause for the determination of the validity of action
taken by those judges who accommodatingly acted as commissioners.2 23
It was because of this savings clause that the Yale Todd case arose; and
the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the United States, starting
from the premise that the Act of 1792, in violation of the Constitution,
sought to impose non-judicial functions on federal circuit courts. Chief
Justice Taney in his note in Ferreirastated that in Yale Todd the Court
determined:
1. That the power proposed to be conferred on the Circuit Courts
of the United States by the act of 1792 was not judicial
power within the meaning of the Constitution, and was, therefore, unconstitutional, and could not lawfully be exercised by
the courts.
2. That as the act of Congress intended to confer the power
on the courts of a judicial function, it could not be construed
as an authority to the judges composing the court to exercise
the power out of court in the character of commissioners.22 4
Nearly a decade after Yale Todd came the landmark decision in
Marbury v. Madison.225 In a great opinion by Chief Justice Marshall,
the Court held that an 'act of Congress which gave the Court jurisdiction beyond that granted by the Constitution was -to the extent of
the extra grant void. In the concluding paragraph of his opinion,
Chief Justice Marshall said:
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void ....226
222. Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 324. As a consequence of the repeal, no
decision on the merits was ever rendered. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)

409 (1792).
223. Act of 1792,

§ 3, 1 Stat. 325. In the interim between the repealing act and

the Yale Todd case, President Washington had Secretary of State Jefferson write to
Chief Justice Jay and his associates on whether their advice would be available to
the executive branch on various important legal questions. After consulting with their
brethren they answered in the negative, "especially as the power given by the Constitution to the President, of calling on the heads of departments for opinions, seems
to have been purposely as well as expressly united to the executive departments."
3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 488--89 (A. Johnston ed. 1891).
The reference is to U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, which provides that the President "may
require the opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer of each of the executive
Departments, upon any subject relative to the Duties of their respective Offices."
224. 54 U.S. at 52, 53 n. In Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796),
reversing the Federal Circuit Court for the District of Virginia, and Clerke v.
Harwood, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 342 (1797), reversing the Maryland High Court of
Appeals, the Court invalidated state statutes because they conflicted with the peace
treaty of 1783 between the United States and Great Britain.

225. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
226. 5 U.S. at 180.
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During the course of his opinion he referred in passing, although
not by name, to the ruling in Yale Todd, as well as the course of the circuit courts under the Act of 1792. With reference to the circuit courts
he commented: "This law being deemed unconstitutional, at the circuits,
was repealed, and a different system was established .

*."..-

He

related the ruling in Yale Todd:
The judgment, in that case, is understood to have decided the
merits of all claims of that description; and the persons, on the
report of the commissioners, found it necessary to pursue the
mode prescribed by the law, subsequent to that which had been
deemed unconstitutional,
in order to place themselves on the
22 8
pension list.

Some legal writers have been unable to accept Yale Todd as the
first case in which the court invalidated an act of Congress. 229 This
must have seemed to them like a downgrading of Marbury v. Madison.
But it is not. Marbury v. Madison remains the same landmark case.
It is still the final word on judicial review of legislative acts. However,
it is not the first case to hold an act of Congress unconstitutional.
That distinction belongs to Yale Todd.
A little over a half century later the Court in Murray's Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,2 30 in considering the effect of
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, had no hesitation in
saying:
The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the
executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be
so construed as to leave congress free to make any process "due
21
process of law," by its mere will.

Judicial review on a case-by-case basis of executive acts, in order
to achieve due process of law, is centuries old. There followed judicial
review of legislative, and later still of administrative acts. Moreover,
these two concepts -

judicial review and due process of law -

are

part of a continuous legal development of nearly eight centuries, from
1178 when Henry II appointed five judges for the whole kingdom
and told them "to do right judgment"2' 8 to the present time. The due
227. 5 U.S. at 171.
228. 5 U.S. at 172.
229. E.g., W. DODD, CASES AND
(5th ed. 1954); 1 J. THAYER, CASES
WARREN,

MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13-14
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 105 (1895) ; 1 C.
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 81-82 (rev. ed. 1937).

230. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
231. Id. at 276, quoted by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion and by Justice
Black in his dissenting opinion in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372-73 n.5, 380 (1970).
232. 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 482 (D. Douglas & G. Greenaway
eds. 1953).
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process rights which the individual obtained, Justice Cardozo described
in the Court's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut's as "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." Justice Harlan thinks of such rights as
those which fundamental fairness requires.
XV.

FUNDAMENTAL

FAIRNESS

Once the Court unshackles the case-by-case application of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment from the selective
incorporation doctrine which the Court embraced, and the incorporation theory which the Court never accepted, it will have a steadier
hand in considering, for due process protection, rights nowhere specifically mentioned in the Constitution under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment as to federal action, and under the due process
clause of the fourteenth as to state action. Thus will the Court, in
its applications of both due process clauses, help us to realize the
better angels of our nature. Thus will it enable us to make our
reach exceed our grasp. The sky will indeed be the limit, as Justice
.Holmes in another connection once feared.23 4
For instance, the thirteenth amendment forbids slavery and involuntary servitude. But can there be any doubt in today's world
that if the thirteenth amendment were not there, the Court would
reach the results of this amendment under the due process clauses?
Or again, the fourteenth amendment provides for equal protection of
the laws. But can there be any doubt that if this clause were not
there, the Court would reach most of the results which this clause
requires under the companion due process clause? For what can be a
greater denial of due process than treatment which is not evenhanded?
Indeed, in Bolling v. Sharpe13 the Court, under the due process clause
of the fifth amendment, outlawed segregation in the public schools
of the District of Columbia, a result which it reached in Brown v.
Board of Education236 under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as to public schools in the states. Chief Justice
Warren, for a unanimous Court said in Boiling:
233. 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The writer used part of this phrase as a chapter
heading in a book, and in the title of an article, 0. RoGGE, THE FIRST AND THE
FIFTH 54-75 (1960); and Rogge, Concept of Ordered Liberty - A New Case, 47
CALIF. L. REV. 238 (1959).
234. In his dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930),
he said:
I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the ever
increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down what I
believe to be the constitutional rights of the States. As the decisions now stand,
I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they
happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable.

235. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
236. .W- U.S. 483 (1954).
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We have this day held that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from maintaining
racially segregated public schools. The legal problem in the
District of Columbia is somewhat different, however. The Fifth
Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia,
does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth

Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts
of equal protection and due process, -both stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, 'are not mutually exclusive. The "equal
protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited
unfairness that "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not
imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as
this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable
23 7
as to be violative of due process.
However, since there is an equal protection clause in the fourteenth
amendment, the Court should apply it on ,a case-by-case basis wherever
applicable to state action in the same manner that the Court applies
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
Various of the justices, even some of those who embrace Justice
Black's incorporation theory, have indicated their acceptance of a
broader role for the due process clauses than the enforcement of the
specifics of the Federal Bill of Rights. They include Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Harlan, Goldberg, Douglas, Brennan, Murphy,
and Rutledge.
In Poe v. Ullman,"'8 where the appellants challenged the validity
of Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices

and the giving of medical advice in the use of such devices, Justice
Harlan, in his dissenting opinion commented:
Indeed the fact that an identical provision limiting federal action
is found among the first eight Amendments, applying to the
Federal Government, suggests that due process is a discrete concept which subsists as an independent guaranty of liberty and
procedural fairness, more general and inclusive than the specific
prohibitions....
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content
cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that
can be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions
it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck
between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If
237. Id. at 498-99. Justice Goldberg, in his concurring opinion in which Chief

Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
486-87 n.1 (1965), pointed out that in this case the Court "derived an equal protection
principle from that Amendment's Due Process Clause."
238. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where
judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might
take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck
by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of
this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive,
while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be
sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for
judgment and restraint.3 9
In Griswold v. Connecticut,2 40 where the Court invalidated the
two same Connecticut statutes which were under attack in Poe v.
Ullman, Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion added:
In my view, the proper constitutional inquiry in this case
is whether this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment
violates basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 ....

For reasons stated

at length in my dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, supra, I
believe that it does. While the relevant inquiry may be aided by
resort to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it
is not dependent on them or any of their radiations. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my
opinion, on its own bottom.2 4 '
In the same case, Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion in which
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined, wrote:
Although I have not accepted the view that "due process" as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates all of the first
eight Amendments . . . I do agree that the concept of liberty

protects those personal rights that are fundamental,
and is not
24 2
confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights.
Some of the justices who accepted the incorporation theory took
a comparable approach. Justice Murphy, for instance, indicated such
an approach as early as his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California 48 in which Justice Rutledge concurred:
I agree that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights
should be carried over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. But I am not prepared to say that the latter
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
381
Id.
Id.

at 542.
U.S. 479 (1965).
at 500.
at 486.

243. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
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is entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights. Occasions
may arise where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming
to fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant condemnadespite the absence of a
tion in terms of lack of due process 244
specific provision in the Bill of Rights.
Justice Douglas carried forward this idea in his dissenting opinion
245

in Poe v. Ullman:

Though I believe that "Due Process" as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment includes all of the first eight Amendments, I do not
think it is restricted and confined to them. We recently held that
the undefined "liberty" in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment includes freedom to travel. Kent v. Dulles....

The

right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children" was
said in Meyer v. Nebraska . ..to come within the "liberty" of

the person protected by the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As I indicated in my dissent in Public Utilities
Commission v. Pollak . . . "liberty" within the purview of the

Fifth Amendment includes the right of "privacy," a right I
thought infringed in that case because a member of a "captive
audience" was forced to listen to a government-sponsored radio
program. "Liberty" is a conception that sometimes gains content
from the emanations of other specific guarantees 246
. . . or from
of a free society.

experience with the requirements

s
One will note that Justice Harlan in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 7
used the phrase "independent guaranty of liberty and procedural fairness."2 4 For a time, there was an identification of the due process
2 49 where
clauses with procedure. For instance, in Chambers v. Florida
the Court suppressed a confession in a state case, Justice Black in
the Court's opinion identified the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments with "procedural standards."2 5
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 124.
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Id. at 516-17.
367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 542.
309 U.S. 227 (1940).

250. Id. at 236. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465, 477 (1921), wrote: "And in the development of our liberty insistence upon
precedural regularity has been a large factor." In a leading case invalidating confessions, McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943), Justice Frankfurter
ended the Court's opinion with these words:
The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of procedural
safeguards. And the effective administration of criminal justice hardly requires
disregard of fair procedures imposed by law.
In attempting to distinguish between substance and form, one is reminded of Sir
Henry Maine's statement about substantive law having "at first the look of being
gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure." H. MAINE, EARLY LAW AND
CUSTOM 389 (1901).
The related ideas of the due process of law and the supremacy of law, we
have often embodied in the sentence, we are a government of laws and not of men.
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Historically, however, it is not correct to confine due process
clauses to any particular area, whether it be procedural safeguards,
property rights, or human rights. These clauses have always had their
"law of the land" meaning as well. In a time when there was an emphasis on procedure, they may seem to have been limited to procedure.
But in a later time when there was an emphasis on property rights, the
champions of such rights also relied upon due process clauses. Chief
Justice Taney, regarding slaves as property, used the due process
clause of the fifth amendment to support his conclusion in the Dred
Scott case2 51 that the provision of one of the two acts known as the
Missouri Compromise which prohibited slavery north of 36' 30"
north latitude except in Missouri was unconstitutional.
However, his opponents also relied upon due process clauses: they
used such clauses in their arguments against slavery. 25 2 In 1856, the
same year as the Dred Scott case, the Republican party in its first
national platform declared:
[T]hat, as our republican fathers, when they had abolished slavery
in all our national territory, ordained that no person should be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
it becomes our duty to maintain this provision of the Constitution
against all attempts to violate it for the purpose of establishing
slavery in any Territory of the United States, by positive
legislation prohibiting its extension there . . .253

James Harrington, in a book published in 1656, after the execution of Charles I of
England, and dedicated to Oliver Cromwell, wanted "an empire of laws, and not of

men."

IDEAL COMMONWEALTHS

183 (Morley ed. 1901). John Adams, in his "The

Report of A Constitution, or form of Government for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts," proposed :
In the government of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the legislative, executive, and judicial power shall be placed in separate departments, to the end that
it might be a government of laws, and not of men.
4 ADAMS, supra note 197, at 230. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Joint
Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 177 (1951), said with emphasis:
"This is a government of laws, not of men." In United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 258 (1947), Justice Frankfurter began his concurring opinion with these
words:
The historic phrase "a government of laws and not of men" epitomizes the distinguishing character of our political society. When John Adams put that phrase
into the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights he was not indulging in a rhetorical
flourish. He was expressing the aim of those who, with him, framed the Declaration of Independence and founded the Republic.
Id. at 307-08. He quoted this in his concurring opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 23 (1958), arising out of the resistance of Arkansas under the leadership of
Governor Orval E. Faubus to desegregation in the public schools as required by the
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
251. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856).
252. See Graham, Procedure to Substance - Extra-JudicialRise of Due Process,
1830-1860, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 483, 492-94 (1953).
253. E. STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENcY 205 (1884). The Republican
party platform of 1860 contained a similar declaration. Id. at 229. The relevant
provisions are also quoted in J.

TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY

ORIGINS OF THE

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 120-21, nn.5 & 6 (1951). The more radical theorists,
such as Alvan Stewart, found in the federal due process clause a source of congres-
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Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut.54 cautioned that the incorporation theory could be used to restrict
the reach of the fourteenth amendment's due process:
In other words, what I find implicit in the Court's opinion is
that the "incorporation" doctrine may be used to restrict the
reach of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. For me this is
just as unacceptable constitutional doctrine as is the use of the
"incorporation" approach to impose upon the States all the requirements of the Bill of Rights as found in the provisions of the
first eight amendments and in the decisions of this Court interpreting them .... 25
Justice Harlan's caution had an illustration in that very case, for
Justice Black was in dissent. In that dissent in which Justice Stewart
joined, Justice Black quoted the warning of Justice Holmes about
the sky being the limit, with reference to the Court's rulings in the
area of state economic regulation, and in turn voiced his own concern
about comparable rulings in the field of human rights in areas beyond
the specifics of the first eight amendments:
My point is that there is no provision of the Constitution which
either expressly or impliedly vests power in this Court to sit
as a supervisory agency over acts of a duly constituted legislative
body and set aside their laws because of the Court's belief that
the legislative policies adopted are unreasonable, unwise, arbitrary,
capricious or irrational. The adoption of such a loose, flexible,
uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitutional, if ever
it is achieved, will amount to a great unconstitutional shift of
power to the courts which I believe and am constrained to say
will be bad for the courts and worse for the country. Subjecting
federal and state laws to such an unrestrained and unrestrainable
judicial control as to the wisdom of legislative enactments would,
I fear, jeopardize the separation of governmental powers that the
Framers set up and at the same time threaten to take away
much of the power of States to govern themselves which the
Constitution plainly intended them to have.256
Let us therefore take the due process clauses on a case-by-case
application. Moreover, let us take them on the basis of Justice Clark's
suggestion in his concurring opinion in Irvine v. California,5 that
they mean what five justices of the Court say they do; or, more
sional power to abolish slavery even in the states. See TENBROEK, supra at 43-48;
Graham, supra note 252, at 492-93.
254. 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (concurring opinion).
255. Id. at 500.
256. Id. at 520-21.
257. 347 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1954) (concurring opinion).
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accurately, as Justice Black indicated in his concurring and dissenting
258
opinion in which Justice Douglas joined, in Williams v. Florida,
that they mean what a majority of the Court say they do. Let those
who feel that a case-by-case application of the due process clauses
produces results which are too indefinite, reflect that in an earlier
time there was a comparable objection to equity: equitable relief was
said to be as variable as the length of the chancellor's foot.2 5 9 But

equity did a needed and creditable job; so has the Federal Supreme
Court in its applications of the due process clauses.
We need some final arbiter as well as guide for the questions
which come and will continue to come before the Court under the
due process clauses. As Justice Douglas recently put it in his concurring opinion in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee: 26 1 "The need of a referee in our federal system has increased

with the passage of time, not only in matters of commerce but in the
field of civil rights as well."
We have been able to hit upon no better final arbiter than
the Court. Indeed, we are fortunate to have this body administer our
concepts of judicial review and due process. Under this system, nine
trained lawyers apply their disciplined minds to due process questions
on a case-by-case basis. They consider the presentations of counsel,
deliberate among themselves and give us their reasoned conclusions.
As Justice Frankfurter explained in Bartkus v. Illinois:2 .
Decisions under the Due Process Clause require close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society. The
Anglo-American system of law is based not upon transcendental
revelation but upon the conscience of society ascertained as best
it may be by a tribunal disciplined for the task and environed
62 by
the best safeguards for disinterestedness and detachment.
In the description of the concept of this kind of due process,
Justice Frankfurter once again does it best. In his concurring opinion
in Griffin v. Illinois, 263 where the Court concluded that indigent de258. 399 U.S. 78, 107 (1970) (concurring and dissenting opinion).
259. John Selden (1584-1654), English jurist, antiquary, and chosen patron of the
Selden Society, complained:
Equity is a Roguish thing: for Law we have a measure, know what to trust too;
Equity is according to the Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as it is
larger or narrower so is Equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make the Standard
for the measure, we call a Foot, a Chancellor's Foot; what an uncertain Measure
would this be? One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a third
an indifferent Foot; 'Tis the same thing in the Chancellor's Conscience.
TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN

260.
261.
262.
263.

372 U.S. 539, 561 (1963).
359 U.S. 121 (1959).
Id. at 128.
351 U.S. 12 (1956).

49 (Pollock ed. 1890).
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fendants in state criminal cases were entitled to a free copy of the
trial transcript where this was necessary for them to be afforded as
adequate appellate review as defendants who had money enough to
buy transcripts, he aptly stated:
"Due Process" is, perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law the least confined to history and the most absorptive of powerful
social standards of a progressive society ... "'
In Sweezy v. New Hamsphire,26 5 in a concurring opinion in which
Justice Harlan joined, he added:
The implications of the United States Constitution for national
elections and "the concept of ordered liberty" implicit in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as against
the States, Palko v. Connecticut ...were not frozen as of 1789

or 1868, respectively. While the language of the Constitution
does not change, the changing circumstances of a progressive
society for which it was designed yield new and fuller import to
its meaning .... 266
In areas outside of the Federal Bill of Rights, the Court has swept
past the position of Justice Black in its applications of the due process
clauses on a case-by-case basis. In like manner the Burger Court
will sweep past the Warren Court, and future Courts will sweep past
the Burger Court. Such is the nature of the case-by-case application
of the due process clauses.
XVI.

EQUAL

PROTECTION

Not only has the Court from time to time applied the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments on a case-by-case basis,
but also as to state action it has similarly applied the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Many decisions in varying situations are illustrative. Under this clause, the Court in Brown v. Board of
Education67 invalidated segregation in the public schools of the states.
264. Id. at 20-21 (concurring opinion).

265. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).

266. Id. at 266. In that case a socialist who lectured at the University of New
sentenced for contempt for his refusal to answer the inquiries of the
Attorney General of New Hampshire about his lecture and the activities of his wife
and others in the formation of the Progressive Party in that state. The legislature
of New Hampshire by a joint resolution had designated the Attorney General as its
agent for the investigation of subversive activities. The Court upset the sentence.
In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), Chief Justice Warren in an
opinion in which Justices Black, Douglas and Whittaker joined, said with reference
to the eighth amendment: "The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
267. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Hampshire was
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Under this clause, the Court in Baker v. Carr268 (a state legislative
apportionment case which corrected the reasoning in Colegrove v.
Green260 ) started on what became its one-man, one-vote course. Thereafter it applied its equal protection, one-man, one-vote rule to elections
for statewide office in Gray v. Sanders, 27 to Congressional districting
by the states in Wesberry v. Sanders,27' to state legislative reapportionment in Reynolds v. Sims 272 and five companion cases, 278 and to many

kinds of local elective governmental units in Avery v. Midland
274
County.

In addition, the Court invalidated the state poll taxes in

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections. 275
Among the Court's most numerous cases under this clause are
those where it invalidated the systematic exclusion of any recognizable,
identifiable group - racial, ethnic, sexual, religious, ethical, economic,
social, political, or geographical; more specifically, Negroes, 276 persons
of Mexican descent 2 7 7 daily wage earners as a class, 278 or women 279

-

from the venires on panels from which grand or petit juries are drawn.
Under the equal protection clause, the Court in Griffin v. Illinois" °
started on a course which, in the words of Chief Justice Burger in
the Court's opinion in the recent case of Williams v. Illinois,28 '

"marked a significant effort to alleviate discrimination against
those
who are unable to meet the costs of litigation in the administration
of criminal justice.
268.
269.
270.
271.

369
328
372
376

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

282

186 (1962).
549 (1946).
368 (1963).
1 (1964).

272. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Alabama).
273. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964) (New York); Maryland
Comm. For Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1954) (Maryland)
Davis
v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) (Virginia) ; Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964)
(Delaware) ; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964)
(Colorado).
274. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
275. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
276. E.g., Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967) (grand and petit juries) ; Jones
v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967) (grand and petit juries); Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545 (1967) (grand and petit juries) ; Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773
(1964) (grand juries) ; Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) (grand juries),
and cases cited; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (grand and
petit juries).
277. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
278. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
279. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
280. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
281. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
282. Id. at 241. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) (cost of a
transcript for appeal) ; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (free transcript
of the record for appeal) ; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (transcript of a
coram nobis hearing for purposes of appeal); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963) (counsel on appeal) ; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fee for
(docket as
feewell
for as
filing
aU.S.
writ252
of (1959)
habeas corpus,
to appeal);
filingmotions
fee forforan leave
v.
appeal);
Burns v.Eskridge
Ohio, 360
Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958)
script for appeal).
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Under this clause, the Court held in Baxstrom v. Herold.8 3 that a
state prisoner was entitled to a review of the determination as to his sanity in conformity with proceedings granted all others civilly committed.
A striking illustration of the Court's application of the equal
protection clause occurred in Hamilton v. Alabama"4 where, without
hearing argument, the Court set aside the contempt conviction of
Miss Mary Hamilton, a Negro woman who declined to answer when
she was addressed as "Mary" in an Alabama court. The county
solicitor had this exchange with Miss Hamilton:
Q. Mary, I believe you were arrested - who were you
arrested by? A. My name is Miss Hamilton. Please address
me correctly.
Q. Who were you arrested by, Mary?
a question until I am addressed correctly.

A. I will not answer

She was immediately held in contempt without a hearing. With poetic
justice, the Court reversed just as summarily, citing its recent per
curiam decision forbidding segregation in state courtrooms. 2 5
Under this clause the Court, at its 1969-1970 term, extended
its one-man, one-vote rule to the election of junior college district
trustees in Hadley v. Junior College District. 6 and to elections on a
city's general obligation bond issue in Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,2s7 and
held in Williams v. Illinois"" in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger
"that an indigent criminal defendant may not be imprisoned in default
of payment of a fine beyond the maximum authorized by the statute
'
regulating the substantive offense.

29

However, there is a mystery in the Court's equal protection decisions, and that is why the mind of Justice Harlan, who has the best
comprehension of the case-by-case application of the due process clauses,
should boggle at the like application of the equal protection clause.
Be that as it may, Justice Harlan in concurring in Williams v. Illinois
sounds like Justice Black in the latter's opposition to the case-by-case
application of the due process clause. Justice Harlan in concurring in
Williams v. Illinois complained:
The "equal protection" analysis of the Court is,
I submit, a "wolf
in a sheep's clothing," for that rationale is no more than a
masquerade of a supposedly objective standard for subjective
283. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
284. 376 U.S, 650 (1964).
285. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
286. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).

287. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
288. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
289. Id. at 241.
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judicial judgment as to what state legislation offends notions of
"fundamental fairness." Under the rubric of "equal protection"
this Court has in recent times effectively substituted its own
"enlightened" social philosophy for that of the legislature no less
than did in the older days the judicial adherents of the now discredited doctrine of "substantive" due process. I, for one, would
prefer to judge the legislation before us in this case in terms of
due process, that is to determine whether it arbitrarily infringes
a constitutionally protected interest of this appellant....
XVII.

CURRENT AND

COMING APPLICATIONS

It may be that in some areas covered by the specifics of the Federal
Bill of Rights, such as those relating to obscenity, to jury trials in
state criminal cases, to confessions in state cases, and to double jeopardy
in state cases, there will seem to some to be a retreat by the Burger
Court from the advanced positions taken by the Warren Court. However, if the Court will throw away the incorporation as well as selective
incorporation crutches which some of its members use, crutches which
the Court never needed and will be stronger without, the Burger Court
in areas beyond the specifics of the first eight amendments will sweep
past the Warren Court, and future Courts in these areas will sweep
past the Burger Court.29 '
290. Id. at 259.
291. In the next issue the author will discuss the possibilities of the Court's
case-by-case application of the due process clause in the areas of obscenity, grand and
petit juries, confessions, double jeopardy, capital punishment, whipping posts, prison
treatment, imprisonment for debt, alimony jails, replevin, comparable creditor practices, practice of contraception, right to an abortion, miscegeneration laws, administrative investigations, administrative determinations, right of privacy, right to know,
right to an education, public accommodations, long hair and dress, use of marijuana,
environment and pollution, and equal rights for women.
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